

The internal dynamics of migration processes

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Abstract

The migration literature has identified the various mechanisms explaining why migration processes tend to gain their own momentum and become self-perpetuating partly independent of their original causes and migration policies. In particular the migration-facilitating role of migrant networks has been extensively studied. The current theoretical literature ascribes a pivotal role to networks in explaining the diffusion of migration access within communities and the relatively autonomous continuation of migration.

However, current theories on the internal dynamics of migration processes are haunted by three fundamental weaknesses. First, by focusing on the role of social capital in the form of migrant networks in endogenously perpetuating migration processes, they tend to underexpose other internal dynamics of migration processes, and in particular contextual feedback mechanisms at the sending and receiving side. Second, they are unable to explain why these network effects do not always occur, as testified by the much-ignored fact that many initial migration moves do not unleash processes of chain migration. Third, the central argument of conventional migration network theories is largely circular, according to which migration goes on *ad infinitum*, assuming a naïve linearity of causality between the growth of migrant communities and (positive) network externalities.

They give surprisingly little, if any, systematic insight in the *internal* mechanisms that counteract the tendencies that lead to increasing migration through networks and which may lead to the weakening of migrant systems over time. This paper aims to outline the contours of a theoretical framework on the internal social, cultural and economic dynamics of migration processes. While systematically distinguishing endogenous (network) and contextual (sending and receiving communities) dynamics, the paper synthesises disparate insights and concepts derived from the sociological, anthropological, economic and geographical migration literature, and applies insights drawn from the critical social capital literature to migration theory.

This synthesis enables an improved understanding of the heterogeneous nature of migration diffusion processes across different social, cultural and economic settings; and inevitably leads to a critical discussion of the fundamentally mixed blessings of social capital in migration processes. The paper concludes by outlining the internal endogenous and contextual internal migration dynamics that tend to create exclusionary mechanisms, increasing selection, negative network externalities and, eventually, the disintegration of migration networks and migration systems.

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1. Introduction

The idea that migration often leads to more migration is anything but new. The migration literature has particularly highlighted the migration-facilitating role of migrant networks. This idea is that, once a critical number of migrants have settled at the destination, migration become self-perpetuating because it creates the social structure to sustain it (Castles & Miller 2003, Massey 1990, Massey et al 1998). Many empirical studies have shown the power of migrant networks in giving migration processes their own momentum.

However, state-of-the-art theories give surprisingly little insight in the internal dynamics that may *counteract* the self-perpetuating dynamics of migration processes and which may lead to the weakening of established migrant systems over time. The argument that migration is a self-reinforcing process is logically problematic because of the circularity of its central argument and the linearity of causality this implicitly assumes.

This paper aims to outline the contours of a theoretical framework on the internal social, cultural and economic dynamics of migration processes. By synthesising disparate insights mainly derived from the sociological, economic and geographical migration literature, it aims to achieve improved understanding of the heterogeneous nature of migration diffusion processes across different social settings. This paper should also be seen as part of a more general effort to bring together the sociology and economics of migration (Boswell & Mueser 2008, 1995), as the analysis will exemplify that the social and economic factors involved in internal migration dynamics are difficult to disentangle.

The paper will first discuss conventional approaches focusing on the role of social capital in explaining processes of chain and network migration. Second, it will be argued that the usual focus on endogenous internal dynamics in the form networks is one sided, because it overlooks other, less direct but no less important *contextual* internal migration dynamics. Building on migration systems theory, the paper subsequently extends the analysis by discussing three contextual feedback mechanisms identified in the literature. These operate through the hypothesised effects of migration on (1) inequality and relative deprivation; (2) local and regional economies; and (3) cultural change in sending communities. Cumulative causation theory, in particular, links endogenous and contextual dynamics by arguing that migration creates more migration not only through networks but also by deepening inequalities undermining local societies and economies, thereby further uprooting their populations.

Subsequently, these approaches will be criticized for their circular line of argumentation and the implicit linear causality, according to which migration seems to go on *ad infinitum*, and their associated inability to theoretically explain the crumbling of migration systems and networks. It will subsequently attempt to identify the most important endogenous and contextual dynamics that *counteract* the self-perpetuating dynamics of migration processes. Notions of non-linearity and saturation of network effects are introduced to the debate on endogenous effects by drawing on diffusion theory.

Naïve assumptions about migration spreading outward to all segments of society will be questioned by drawing on the critical social capital literature, showing that close-knit migration networks also tend to be highly exclusionary for outsiders. This will lead us to a critical discussion of the fundamentally mixed blessings of social capital in migration processes. Also cumulative causation theory will be criticized for its circular and linear line of argumentation, which is not only logically consistent but also conflicting with empirical evidence.

The final sections will synthesise the various insights presented by proposing an ideal-typical conceptual framework explaining the *heterogeneous* rise and fall of migration systems over time. This framework will be based on the powerful notion of migration as a spatio-temporal diffusion process, but will be amended with the various theoretical insights discussed in the paper. Hence, pioneer migration will be cast as innovative behaviour, often by non-conformist community members escaping *negative* social capital such as the oppressive lack of personal freedoms. In order to explain why only some initial migratory moves by pioneer migrants result in large-scale group migration through networks, the analysis will distinguish “herd” and network effects and discussing their shifting role in different stages of migration processes.

While most endogenous and contextual effects of migration tend to self-reinforce migration processes during the early adopter and early majority phases of migration, most of these effects are generally not linear. Therefore, this section will also outline the main contextual internal dynamics that tend to lead to the weakening of established migration systems and migrant networks over time. It will show how, with the growth of migrant communities and the passing of time, positive externalities of network formation and economics of scale of the growth of immigrant clusters tend to decline and may finally become negative. This explains why settled migrants and their descendants often become from “bridgeheads” to “gatekeepers”. In addition, negative social capital in the form of excessive claims by nonmigrant community members and strong moral pressure to support them, seems to play an important role in the crumbling of migration systems.

2. Existing theories on internal migration dynamics

2.1. Chain migration

Migration may begin for a variety of reasons. Although the truism holds that opportunity differentials almost always a major role in explaining migration this alone cannot explain the actual, highly specialized and geographically clustered morphology of migration, typically linking particular places and regions at the sending and receiving end (Massey et al 1998, Salt 1987). Structural *forces majeures* in the international political economy such as warfare, colonialism, conquest, occupation and labour recruitment often play a role in the *initiation* of, particularly international, migration processes (Castles & Miller 2003, Massey et al 1998, Skeldon 1997). Also former colonial or other historical bonds, or a shared culture or language, tend to

make initial migration moves more likely and have a high influence on the geographical structuring of migration patterns. For instance, wage differentials alone cannot explain why many Moroccans have migrated to France, or to the French-speaking Canadian Province of Quebec, and why so many Moroccan Jews migrated to Israel. Despite globalisation geographical proximity continues to play an important role, especially in the migration of low skilled workers. For instance, it seems no coincidence that most African migrants in Spain are Moroccans. Also in an age of globalization, distance has not lost its relevance.

However, once a certain critical number of migrants have settled at the destination, other forces internal to the migration process itself come into play. The deliberate or more ambiguous choices made by pioneer migrants or labour-recruiters tend to have a great influence on the location choice of subsequent migrants, which tend to follow the already beaten track. Again, the idea that inter-personal relations across space facilitate migration is anything but new (cf. Franz 1939). In his “General Typology of Migration”, Petersen (1958) already argued that “Migration becomes a style, an established pattern, an example of collective behaviour. Once it is well begun, the growth of such a movement is semi-automatic”. Lee (1966: 54-55) argued that migration facilitates the flow of information back from the place of destination to the origin, facilitating the passage for later migrants.

While the term *chain migration* has already been used by Kenny (1962) and, particularly, Price (1963) in his study of the migration of southern Europeans to Australia, it was coined by MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) in their seminal article “Chain migration, ethnic neighbourhood formation, and social networks”. Drawing on the example of large-scale migration from Italy to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century, MacDonald and MacDonald defined chain migration as “that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged *by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants*” (p. 82, emphasis in original). Importantly, they distinguished chain migration from “impersonally organized migration”; movement based on impersonal recruitment and assistance.

2.2. Migrant networks as social capital

MacDonald and MacDonald’s initial idea that migrant *networks* based on kinship and community membership facilitate processes of chain migration has been further elaborated by Tilly and Brown (1967) and Choldin (1973) and has retained currency in the multidisciplinary literature on internal and international migration (Boyd 1989, Fawcett 1989, Gurak & Caces 1992, Haug 2008, Taylor 1986, Waldorf 1998). Migrant networks can be defined as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey et al 1993: 448). Network effects explain the (often unintended) perpetuation of migration and its continuation partly irrespective of its original causes. Migrant network analysis has also become popular because it is seen a vital meso-level or intermediate structure linking individual migrants, households and families to social, economic and political structures at the macro level (Faist 1997, Haug 2008).

Migrant network can be interpreted as location-specific social capital. Since the mid 1980s, the concept of *social capital* as defined by Bourdieu (1979, translated and reprinted in Bourdieu 1985) has gained enormous popularity in social sciences. Bourdieu defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a *durable network of* more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, *to membership in a group*” (Bourdieu 1985: 248)¹. Bourdieu makes an essential distinction between the networks themselves and the resources that can be claimed through such networks by pointing out that the volume of the social capital possessed by a person depends on the (1) size of the network connections and the (2) volume of the (economic, cultural or symbolical) capital possessed by each of those to whom he is connected. Bourdieu argued that the profits which accrue from membership of a group are consciously or unconsciously the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible (Bourdieu 1979, Bourdieu 1985). Social capital is therefore to be considered as a resource that can be partially converted in other forms of human (Coleman 1988) economic, cultural and capital (Bourdieu 1985, Portes 1998).

In the late 1980s, the concept of social capital was gratefully applied by Douglas Massey and his colleagues to the study of Mexico-US migrant networks (Massey et al 1993, Massey & España 1987, Massey et al 1994, Massey & Zenteno 1999, Palloni et al 2001). Migrant network connections can then be conceived as a form of location-specific social capital that people draw upon to gain access to resources, such as employment, abroad. Massey stresses the importance of migrant networks in decreasing the direct costs of migration, information and search costs, opportunity and psychic costs of migration. He conceptualised migration as a diffusion process within communities, in which

expanding networks cause the costs of movement to fall and the probability of migration to rise; these trends feed off one another, and over time migration spreads outward to encompass all segments of society. This feedback occurs because the networks are created by the act of migration itself Once the number of network connections in an origin area reach a critical level, migration becomes self-perpetuating because migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it (Massey 1990: 8)

So, besides financial and human capital, social capital is a third crucial factor determining people’s motivation and ability to migrate. Social structures of migrant communities should therefore be taken into account in order to understand specific patterns of migration selectivity. Empirical work has largely confirmed the hypothesis that migrant network facilitate migration (Palloni et al 2001), although migrant networks seem to be more important for international than for internal migration due to the generally higher costs and risks involved in trans-boundary movements (cf. Curran & Rivero-Fuentes 2003). Differential access to social capital in the form of migrant networks connection largely explain the distinct, geographically bundled patterns of migration flows, which are highly dissimilar from the random patterns

¹ This is a translation from Bourdieu’s (1979:2) original definition of social capital in French. The emphasis was in in the original version.

predicted by orthodox neo-classical and place-utility ('push-pull') models, which therefore seem to have limited heuristic value.

2.3. Self-reinforcing mechanisms

As the costs and risks of migration are lowered by social and informational networks, once established migration streams tend to gain their own momentum. Already settled migrants function as "bridgeheads" (Böcker 1994), reducing the risks as well as material and psychological costs of subsequent migration. Through the assistance of friends and relatives, new migrants may more easily be able to obtain information and receive active assistance in finding employment and a place to live, in arranging residence papers, or in finding a marriage partner. Therefore, the formation of an established migrant community at one particular destination will increase the likelihood of subsequent migration to that particular place.

In addition, research on migrant transnationalism has pointed at the radically increased technical possibilities for migrants and their families to pursue multi-local livelihoods, to foster double loyalties, to travel back and forth, to communicate with and relate to people, and to work and to do business simultaneously in distant places, and to adopt new hybrid, or "transnational" identities (Faist 2000, Glick Schiller et al 1992, Guarnizo et al 2003, Portes 2003, Vertovec 2004). Transnational social ties can become transgenerational. This is exemplified by the post-migration survival of traditional marriage patterns and the high frequency of marriages between the "second generation" Moroccans and nonmigrants in Morocco (Lievens 1999, Reniers 2001). This exemplifies the importance of transnational social capital in sustaining migration processes over many decades.

The 'migration industry' is the other main example of intermediate, self-sustaining structures largely created or reinforced by migration processes themselves. This includes travel agents, lawyers, bankers, labour recruiters, brokers, interpreters, housing agents as well as human smugglers and traffickers (Castles 2004). All these agents have an interest in the continuation of migration, and for many facilitating migration is a major business (Salt & Stein 1997). The distinction with migrant networks is often rather blurred. Many recruiters, brokers, interpreters, smugglers and traffickers are (former) migrants themselves, and tend to extensively draw on their personal social networks (Bredeloup & Pliez 2005, de Haas 2008). Page: 7

The cost and risk reducing role of networks and other intermediate factors makes migration, once set in motion, notoriously difficult to control for governments. For instance, migrant networks largely explain why the number Moroccan migrants living in Europe is many times higher than the number of originally recruited migrants. Even in 1976, at the eve of the 1973 recruitment stop, 43 percent the Moroccans living in the Netherlands had migrated through personal relations (Shadid 1979). A more recent study demonstrated that only 3.5 percent of the Moroccans in Belgium had been recruited through official selection (Reniers 1999). Ongoing network migration, mainly in the form of family reunification and family formation by the second generation, largely explains how the total Morocco born population in Europe could increase at least fivefold from an estimated 300,000 in 1972 to at least 1.5 million in

2005 despite increasingly restrictive immigration policies pursued by European states (de Haas 2007b).

3. Distinguishing endogenous and contextual internal dynamics

3.1. *Beyond network effects*


Although there is little doubt that migrant networks often facilitate onward migration through the provision of information and ‘migration help’, there are other, more indirect mechanisms that operate at the contextual level explaining why migration can become a self-reinforcing process. These mechanisms operate through migration-affected changes in sending and receiving communities which, in their turn, affect migration. To reach more conceptual clarity, it is useful to distinguish between (1) endogenous or intermediate and (2) contextual level causes of migration. Social networks can be conceived as the intermediate structure created by the migration process itself linking individual migrants and their households to the wider social² context at the sending at receiving end.

On the basis of this distinction, we can distinguish first and second order internal migration dynamics. First order internal dynamics are effects that are *endogenous* to the migration process itself. Network effects are the most powerful example of first order internal migration dynamics. As argued above, the migration process itself directly affects the ability of individuals and households with social links to migrants to migrate themselves. Second order level internal migration dynamics operate more indirectly, that is, through the ways in which migration transform the broader social, cultural and economic contexts in sending *and* receiving communities and societies. These broader contexts caused migration in the first place, but are reciprocally affected by the same migration processes. The crux is that such migration-engendered contextual changes have their own, reciprocal effects on the occurrence of subsequent migration. Whereas there is rather extensive literature on endogenous effects, contextual effects have received less attention in the literature. They have rarely been theoretically connected to the internal dynamics of migration processes or are confounded with network effects.

This exemplifies the need to study migration processes in their wider societal context to gain a full understanding of the dynamics at play. Migration is a process which is an (1) integral part of broader socio-economic transformation processes, but (2) also has its internal, self-sustaining *and self-undermining* dynamics, and (3) affects such processes of change in its own right, in particular at the local and regional level. In their turn, these migration-affected changes (4) affect subsequent migration patterns. Where (2) refers to direct (endogenous) internal dynamics, (4) refers to indirect (contextual) internal dynamics of migration processes.

² Throughout this paper I will interpret ‘social’ in its broadest sense, that is, all dimensions of human society and its organization, embracing its social, cultural, economic and political dimensions.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of endogenous and contextual internal migration dynamics



It is analytically useful to distinguish between contextual and exogenous factors. Contextual factors relate to the concrete communities and localities migrants are embedded in at the sending and receiving end. These are likely to be fundamentally affected by migration processes. Exogenous factors refer to the national and global political economy and society-wide processes of spatially differentiated social, economic and cultural change, which create interspatial opportunity differentials conducive to migration. Although migration eventually also affect such broader processes of change, this macro-level impact is limited compared to localized and regional impacts and mainly indirect, and therefore of no direct importance to internal migration dynamics. For the sake of this analysis, which focuses on micro and meso level internal dynamics, it is therefore justifiable to consider these factors as exogenous. Figure 1 depicts this differentiation between endogenous, contextual and exogenous effects, which will serve as the overarching conceptual framework for this paper. Table 1 summarises the most important endogenous and contextual internal dynamics, which will be discussed in the remainder of this paper.

Table 1. Internal endogenous and contextual dynamics of migration processes

Type	Level	Domain		
		<i>Social</i>	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Cultural</i>
Endogenous (First order effects)	Intermediate - (migrant group)	Migrant networks; 'Migration industry'	Remittance-financed migration	Transfers of migration-related ideas and information
Contextual (second order effects)	Origin community	Social stratification and relative deprivation	Income distribution, productivity and employment	Social remittances; culture of migration
	Destination community	Patterns of clustering, integration and assimilation	Demand for migrant labour generated by clusters of migrant businesses	Transnational identities, demand for marriage partners

3.2. Migration systems theory

Migration systems can be defined as spatially clustered flows and counterflows of people, goods and remittances between a particular community of origin and a particular destination.³ Migration systems theory as pioneered by the Nigerian geographer Akin Mabogunje (1970) has been the most comprehensive attempt at integrating both first (endogenous) and second order (contextual) migration system feedbacks so far. A migration system can be defined as a set of places linked by flows and counter-flows of people, goods, services, and information, which *tend* to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places. Borrowing from general systems theory, Mabogunje (1970) focused on the role of flows of information and new ideas (such as on what is the “good life” and new consumption patterns) in shaping migration systems. He stressed the importance of feedback mechanisms, through which information about destinations is transmitted back to the place of origin. Information is then not only *instrumental* in facilitating further migration, but Mabogunje also suggests that new ideas and exposure to urban life styles transmitted back by migrants may also increase *aspirations* to migrate. Such feedback mechanisms would lead to situations of

almost organized migratory flows from particular villages to particular cities. In other words, the existence of information in the system encourages greater deviation from the “most probable or random state” In many North-African cities, for instance, it is not uncommon for an entire district or craft occupation in a city to be dominated by permanent migrants from one or two villages [The] state of a system at any given time is not determined so much by its initial conditions as by the nature of the process, or the system parameters since open systems are basically independent of their initial conditions (Mabogunje 1970:13-4)

³ It is also possible to distinguish migration systems at the macro, country-to-country level. However, such as analysis would go beyond the aim of this paper, which is focused on micro and meso level migration processes.

Migration systems link people, families, and communities over space. This results in a rather neat geographical structuring and clustering of migration flows, which is far from a “random state”:

formal and informal subsystems operate to perpetuate and reinforce the systematic nature of international flows by encouraging migration along certain pathways, and discouraging it along others. The end result is a set of relatively stable exchanges yielding an identifiable geographical structure that persists across space and time (Mabogunje 1970:12)

While Mabogunje focused his analysis on rural-urban migration in Africa, migration systems theory can be extended to international migration (Fawcett 1989, Kritz et al 1992). International migration systems consist of countries—or, more accurately, places within different countries—that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants in which the movement of people is functionally connected to concomitant flows and counterflows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas, and information (Fawcett 1989, Gurak & Caces 1992, Massey et al 1998). Migration systems link people over space in what today is often referred to as transnational communities (Castles 2002, Riccio 2001, Vertovec 2004).

The resulting clustered morphology of migration flows can typically not be explained by push-pull theories, corroborating their limited heuristic value. In almost all emigration countries, we often see that particular regions, villages, or ethnic (sub) groups tend to specialize in migration to particular areas, cities, or even city neighbourhoods, either within the same country or abroad. For example, the vast majority of the international migrants from Figuig, an isolated oasis in southern Morocco, live in particular quarters of Paris (Saa 1998). Many migrants from Laârache in northern Morocco happen to live in London—which is not a “typical” destination for Moroccan migrants at all—and certain villages in the northern Rif mountains are firmly linked to specific German or Dutch cities (de Haas 2003).

Whereas network theory mainly focuses on the way in which trans-local social capital in the form of interpersonal networks sustains migration processes, migration systems theory focuses on the role of counterflows of information and ideas in facilitating and inspiring people to migrate in order to achieve (newly set) life objectives. However, and despite its considerable merits, migration systems theory does not really go beyond that point. Its focus on bidirectional *flows* of people, information and goods between sending and receiving ends coincides with a relative neglect of how migration transforms sending and receiving communities and societies more generally.

In order to gain a fuller understanding of second order system feedbacks, we need to extend the analysis by postulating that migration not only affects the direct micro-social environment of migrants, but restructures the entire context in which migration takes place. The assumption is that migration alters social, cultural and economic structures both the sending and receiving ends—that is, the entire social space within which migration processes operate. Through such feedback mechanisms, migration changes the initial conditions under which prior migration took place. The following three sections will extend migration systems theory by discussing the three main contextual feedback mechanisms that have been identified in the literature, that is, the

impact of migration on (1) inequality and relative deprivation; (2) local and regional economies; and (3) cultural change in sending communities.

3.3. Migration, income inequality and relative deprivation

It is possible to extend migration systems theory by drawing on the research literature focusing on the effects of migration on sending and receiving societies. Although these strands of literature have largely evolved separately, they can be relatively combined into a more comprehensive account of second order, contextual internal migration dynamics. Massey's (1990) hypothesis of the cumulative causation of migration is the most comprehensive effort at synthesising relevant insights endogenous and contextual internal migration dynamics so far. Massey reintroduced Myrdal's (1957) concept of circular and cumulative causation, or "the idea that migration induces changes in social and economic structures that make additional migration likely" (Massey 1990: 5-6). In fact, this is fundamentally the same idea as posited by Mabogunje's (1970) migration systems theory.

Cumulative causation, as interpreted by Massey, incorporated previously developed theories on chain and network migration, but extended it by discussing some second order internal migration dynamics.

However, Massey (1990) went beyond common network explanations by incorporating the impacts of migration and, particularly, remittances on the (1) distribution of income and wealth and the (2) economic structure of sending communities. It is therefore unfortunate that the majority of later interpretations of cumulative causation have focused on network effects and have ignored the network side, while this was his major contribution to the debate.

One of the most important contextual dynamics through which migration become self-reinforcing is the effect of remittances on income distributions in sending societies. In particular in the case of international migration from poor to wealthy counties, remittances may significantly increase income inequality and, hence, may upset 'traditional' socio-economics hierarchies. For instance, a study conducted in a southern Morocco migrant sending region showed that the average income of households receiving remittances from Europe twice the income of other households. The study showed that new forms of inequality, mainly based on access to international remittances monetary resources, have been largely superimposed upon the traditional forms of structural, hereditary inequality based on kinship, complexion and land ownership (de Haas 2006). Remittances and (conspicuous) consumption by migrants can therefore easily increase the feeling of relative deprivation among non-migrants, and increase their aspirations to migrate as a way to achieve upward socio-economic mobility.

So, besides networks, migration and remittance-induced increases in community-level income inequality and, hence, relative deprivation is hypothesized to build a strongly self-perpetuating tendency into the process of migration. Relative deprivation and network effects can easily reinforce each other, because the first effect is likely to increase the aspirations to migrate while the second effect lowers the costs and risks

of migration. Risk diversification and relative deprivation, as also postulated by the new economics of labour migration, and as confirmed by many empirical studies, are important incentives for nonmigrants to migrate (Quinn 2006, Stark 1991, Stark & Taylor 1989). Besides this motivational effect of relative deprivation, remittances are can also directly or indirectly finance migration of family and community members (van Dalen et al 2005), but this is an endogenous rather than contextual effect. While pioneer migrants are often among the *relatively* well-off, this interaction sets in motion a diffusion process which tends to make (international) migration generally more accessible for other groups.

3.4. Cumulative causation and the “migrant syndrome”

The second main second order internal migration dynamic identified by Massey (1990: 12) operates through the hypothesised negative of migration on the economic structures and productivity in migrant sending communities and regions. Massey hypothesises that large-scale out-migration of the “most productive members of the household (fathers and older sons)” often leads to less intensive farming and overall disruption of agrarian organisation. Moreover, migrant households would be more likely to let their lands lie fallow, whereas remittances would be mainly invested in labour saving techniques, further restricting local opportunities for production and employment. This would then further exacerbate the feedback loop connecting migration, agrarian change and further migration.

There is a clear link here to the broader literature on migration and development, which has traditionally opposed positive and negative views on migration’s role in either stimulating or undermining development in sending communities and countries (de Haas 2007a). Cumulative causation particularly fits well into “pessimistic” theories on migration (and development), which gained popularity in the 1970s and 1980s under the influence of a paradigm shift away from developmentalist theory towards neo-Marxist and dependency (Frank 1966, Frank 1969) theories of development (see also Castles & Miller 2003)

Cumulative causation theory as originally formulated by Myrdal (1957) holds that capitalist development is inevitably marked by deepening spatial welfare inequalities. Once differential growth has occurred, internal and external economies of scale perpetuate and deepen the bipolar pattern characterized by the vicious cycle of poverty in the periphery and the accelerated growth of the core region. Although positive “spread effects” also occur—such as increased demand for agricultural products and raw materials trade from the periphery and these do not match the negative “backwash effects”. Myrdal argued that, without strong state policy, the capitalist system therefore fosters increasing regional inequalities.

Applied to migration, this perspective turns the argument of neo-classical and developmentalist approaches upside down. While neo-classical perspectives predicted long-term convergence of income and other opportunities through a process of factor price equalization, cumulative causation theory posits that migration does not decrease, but *increase* income disparities between sending and receiving countries and localities. Cumulative causation theory predicts that migration undermines

sending economies by depriving them of their valuable human and material capital resources, which are exploited for the benefit of industrialized countries (international migration) and urban-based capitalist elite groups within developing countries (internal migration) in need of cheap migrant labour. Migration undermines regional and local economies by depriving communities of their most valuable labour force, increasing dependence on the outside world (of which remittances are but one manifestation) and stimulating subsequent out-migration (Almeida 1973, Binford 2003, Lewis 1986, Lipton 1980, Reichert 1981, Rhoades 1979, Rubenstein 1992). In this way, the productive structures at the origin would be progressively undermined, contributing to “asymmetric growth”—as opposed to the neo-classical equilibrium model of factor price equalization and spatial income convergence—and the increasing dependency of the underdeveloped on the developed core countries (cf. Almeida 1973). This pauperization is seen as encouraging further out-migration. migration-induced dependency, instability, and developmental distortion are assumed to result in economic decline (Keely & Tran 1989:501). Negative perspectives were amalgamated into what might be called the “migrant syndrome”(Reichert 1981), the vicious circle of migration – more underdevelopment – more migration, and so on.

At the receiving end, employment growth is supposed to generate more migration, “which stimulates further employment growth, which stimulates further migration, revealing a macroeconomic process of cumulative causation” (Massey 1990: 15). Ethnic enclaves might provide labour in ethnic businesses. If they are sufficiently large in number, immigrant populations might therefore produce network externalities that will attract other migrants (Epstein 2008: 568). More generally, patterns of occupational specialisation (also outside of “ethnic businesses”) and segmentation of labour markets tend to perpetuate the demand for migrant labour within specific economic niches (Castles & Miller 2003, Massey et al 1993, Piore 1979).

Cumulative causation theory hypothesizes that migration is a selective process – attracting those with the greatest endowments of human capital – and therefore contributes to economic growth and labour demand in receiving societies, while having the opposite effects in sending societies, engendering further opportunity disparities, leading to even more migration (Massey 1990, Myrdal 1957). In neo-Marxist terms, migration not only reproduces but further *reinforces* the capitalist system based on global class inequality.

3.5. Social remittances and cultures of migration

Besides the impact of migration on (1) social stratification and relative deprivation and (2) the economic structure in sending communities, the framework of migration systems theory can be extended with a third contextual system feedback in the form of (3) migration driven forms of cultural and social change, which reciprocally affect people’s future propensity to migrate. While contextual impact of counterflows of information and ideas and the effect of migration on aspirations was already been acknowledged by Mabogunje (1970) and others, Levitt (1998) coined the term “social remittances” to describe ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital flowing from receiving to sending communities. While Levitt focused on the importance role of social remittances in social and political life in sending countries, the concept can also

be applied to migration systems theory in order to include non-material feedback mechanisms in our framework.


Migration and the close confrontation with other norms and practices this involves, tends to have to have a profound influence on identity formation, norms and behaviour in migrant sending communities. This may lead to the emergence of a “culture of migration”, in which migration becomes a social norm or even a modern *rite de passage* (Massey et al 1993: 453). If international migration becomes strongly associated with personal, social, and material success, migrating can become the norm rather than the exception and staying home is associated with failure. Such migration-affected cultural change is likely to generate self-sustaining dynamics by further strengthening migration propensities along established pathways in communities and societies that can become obsessed with migration. Thus, the feedback mechanisms propelled by social remittances stimulate migration because they tend to increase aspirations to migrate in largely similar ways as relative deprivation does. This effect should be distinguished from the role of migrant networks and remittances in lowering costs and risks of migrating.

In Moroccan sending regions, for instance, international migrants have often become new role models. Their yearly massive return during summer holidays and exposure to the relative wealth of migrants and their direct relatives have increased the sense of relative deprivation and, hence, aspirations among nonmigrants. The latter effect exemplifies that processes of economic and cultural change are difficult to disentangle. Migration has had an important influence on life rhythm and seasonality. Instead of the sowing and harvest seasons in autumn and spring, the July-August holiday season is now the yearly economic and cultural peak season, when markets are at their busiest and most marriage feasts take place. Migration influence local tastes and styles, which is for instance visible in the construction of urban of European style houses and villas by migrants (Ait Hamza 1995, de Haas 2003, Kerbout 1990).

Through the exposure to migrants’ (perceived) relative success, wealth and status symbols (international) migration has almost become an obsession as it is perceived as the main or only avenue of upwards socio-economic mobility (Fadloulah et al 2000), and in which ambitions, life projects and dreams of people are generally situated *elsewhere* (Hajjarabi 1988). The fact that migrants often have a tendency to present themselves as successful and to conceal their economic and social problems would further fuel this culture of migration.

The exposure of nonmigrants to the relative wealth and success of migrants, combined with changing “urban” tastes and material aspirations, makes the rural way of life less appealing, discourage local people from working in traditional economic sectors, and encourage even more out-migration. This would lead to a “culture of migration”, in which youth can only imagine a future through migrating. For many youngsters, the question is not so much whether to migrate, as *when* and *how* to migrate. The hopes of many young non-migrants are focused on marriage with an international migrant as the most secure way of migrating abroad. This fixation on migration can be so overwhelming that in several Moroccan migrant sending areas a large number of young men were not only jobless but not looking for work either (Fadloulah et al 2000, Schoorl et al 2000).

Figure 2. The ‘migrant syndrome’ – hypothesised contextual internal migration dynamics at the sending side



Source: Author’s literature review of cumulative causation and neo-Marxist migration theory

More generally, the socio-cultural impacts of migration on sending communities tend to receive a bad press. Migration is often held responsible for the disruption of traditional kinship systems and care structures (King & Vullnetari 2006), the loss of community solidarity and the undermining of their “sociocultural integrity” (Hayes 1991). The exposure to the wealth of (return) migrants and the goods and ideas they bring with them, would contribute to changing rural tastes (Lipton 1980:12), lowering the demand for locally produced goods, increasing the demands for imported urban or foreign-produced goods, and thereby increasing the general costs of living in sending communities. This again shows the close conceptual links that can be drawn between the effects of financial and social remittances and how processes of social, cultural and economic migration-related change are inextricably linked.

Because notions about whether and which migration is an acceptable or desirable choice are likely to be influenced by shared beliefs and values (cf. Boswell 2008: 558), prior migration moves are likely to shape the preferences (Radu 2008) and locational choices of future migrants – migration-induced cultural changes is another explanation of the spatially clustered, fundamentally non-random state of empirically observed migration patterns. State-of-the-art insights into migration-induced

contextual changes can be amalgamated into an extended conceptual framework of cumulative causation, depicted in figure 2, in which the impacts of migration on inequality, economic production and cultural change tends to increase people's need and aspirations to migrate.

4. What conventional theories *cannot* explain

4.1. Questioning the circularity and linearity of network theory

Notwithstanding their considerable merits, conventional theories and empirical work on the internal dynamics of migration processes are characterised by three weaknesses. First, most research concentrates on endogenous feedback mechanisms, mainly in the form of migrant networks. This tends to conceal second order internal dynamics that operate through contextual effects at the sending *and* receiving side. The previous sections analysed how general processes of social, economic and cultural change in receiving and sending communities and societies not only affect migration but *are also affected by* migration processes through various endogenous and contextual effects summarised in table 1. At first sight, it seems relatively straightforward to integrate network theory, migration systems theory and cumulative causation theory into a single conceptual framework perspective of the first order (endogenous) and second order (contextual) internal mechanisms of migration (see figure 1). The endogenous and contextual dynamics described above seem to reinforce each other, and jointly seem to form a powerful heuristic tool for understanding why migration processes tend to become self-sustaining and typically gain their own momentum.

However, this conceals a second, and more fundamental, weakness of network, migration systems and cumulative causation theories, which is the linear circularity of their core arguments, according to which migration seems to go on *ad infinitum*. They give surprisingly little insight in the external and, particularly, internal (endogenous and contextual) dynamics that may *counteract* the self-perpetuating dynamics of migration processes and which may lead to the weakening of migrant systems over time. As we will see, the circularity of these theories is rooted in the assumption that the relation between increases in migration and migrant communities on the one hand and endogenous effects and contextual externalities are linear and always positive. These assumptions are not only logically inconsistent and at odds with theories on diffusion and (dis) economies of scale but also conflicting with empirical evidence. The circularity of the argument "migration leads to more migration" is the both strength and weakness of such theories. This explains the need for more sophisticated conceptual frameworks that are to account for non-linearity of such relations

Third, conventional theories are unable to explain the frequent *non-occurrence* of self-reinforcing internal migration dynamics. They do not give any meaningful insight into the question why most migration moves do not unleash processes of chain migration to evolve into full-blown migration systems, and why some do. Because studies of migration networks tend to sample on the dependent variable, they tend to ignore and fail to explain the many cases in which migration moves do not set in

motion self-reinforcing endogenous and contextual feedback dynamics. Network and cumulative causation theory both postulate that the number of migrants and network connections first has to reach a certain but unspecified *critical level* before migration becomes self-perpetuating through the creation of a social structure to sustain the process (cf. Castles & Miller 2003, Massey 1989). After all, if these self-reinforcing processes would apply from the beginning, all initial migration moves would evolve into migration systems. This raises the following question: Which factors explain the much-ignored fact that only some initial migration moves unleash a process of chain migration leading to the establishment of migration systems?

4.2. Explaining heterogeneity

The study of migration networks has become very popular in the past two decades (cf. Haug 2008, Heering et al 2004, Palloni et al 2001, Winters et al 2001), which is not unrelated to the striking popularity of the concept of social capital in social sciences generally. The accumulation of social capital in the form of migration related knowledge and resources therefore tends to lead to a further diffusion of the migration experiences within communities, regions and even nations. Yet there is a tendency to accept the arguments of network theories too uncritically. They cannot explain the real-life heterogeneity and variances in the occurrence and power of network dynamics.

Conventional network theories fail to explain why most initial migration moves do *not* result in network dynamics and do not give insight into the internal mechanisms that lead to the heterogeneous weakening, crumbling and disappearance of migrant networks. While some migration networks – such as among Italians in the United States (MacDonald & MacDonald 1964) – may prove sustainable and inter-generational, others, such as those among Algerians in France (Collyer 2005), seem to crumble much faster. The main point is to go beyond a circular and teleological perspective in order to account for the *heterogeneity* of migrant network dynamics. Network decline is usually explained as the result of the gradual weakening of transnational social ties. Although this seems indeed an important explanation, this argument is somehow inconsistent with the idea that network migration continuously ‘refreshes’ these bonds. Moreover, it cannot explain why such weakening occurs very fast for some migrant groups, and much slower or not at all for other.

4.3. The conflicting internal logics of cumulative causation

Migratory cumulative causation theory as coined by Douglas Massey was a major step forward because it goes beyond network analysis by incorporating contextual feedback mechanisms in explaining why migration can become a self-perpetuating process. Cumulative causation theory is analogous to migration systems theory in the sense that it links the process of migration to the dynamics in the local and community context at both the origin and destination. The main difference is that cumulative causation theory is more explicit on the nature of the impact of migration on sending areas, and its verdict is clearly negative. The central idea is that migration

leads to more migration because the social, cultural and economic effects of migration further undermine social cohesion and productivity in sending communities (see figure 2).

Yet, cumulative causation theory as applied to the analysis of migration processes suffers from a number of internal logical inconsistencies and it has also been clearly refuted by empirical evidence pointing at the complex, heterogeneous and non-linear character of contextual migration impacts. First, as with network theory, there is an uncomfortable circularity in the feedback mechanisms posited by cumulative causation and the “migrant syndrome”, according to which the vicious cycle of impoverishment of “pauperization” in the periphery and migration and growth at the core seems to go on *ad infinitum*.

This is suspect, since it seems unrealistic to assume that there are no counter-mechanisms which level-off or change the nature of this supposedly *linear* process over time. In particular, how far can impoverishment and “under-development” go on without decreasing migration? In addition, the deterministic nature of cumulative causation does not give room for heterogeneity in the specific, localized migration impacts. For instance, for what precise reasons would positive spread effects (e.g., remittances, innovations) never match negative backwash effects (e.g., lost labour, brain drain) under certain conditions?

This leads us to the second problem, which is empirical. An increasing body of empirical research has appeared in the 1980s and 1990s indicating that, under certain circumstances, migration can play a positive role in the social and economic development of regions and countries of origin (cf. Agunias 2006, de Haas 2007c, Taylor et al 1996a, Taylor et al 1996b). Massey and his colleagues themselves have later challenged the prevailing view that migration discourages local and national economic growth and that it promotes economic dependency. Based on their surveys of Mexican-US migration, they showed that the inflow of remittances stimulate economic activity, both directly and indirectly, and that led to significantly higher levels of employment, investment, and income (Durand et al 1996)

The accumulated evidence has clearly indicated that international migration has a real *potential* to improve well-being, stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty directly and indirectly, in particular through remittances. Evidence on the heterogeneity of migration impacts went along with a more general critique on the rigidity of structuralist and neo-Marxist migration theory under influence of the rise of pluralist, more empirically informed theories such as the new economics of labour migration (Stark 1991, Taylor 1999). Apparently, the self-reinforcing cyclical mechanisms of asymmetrical, polarizing development cannot be taken as axiomatic.

Although situations reminiscent of the “migration syndrome” do occur, under favourable general (economic, political) conditions migrants do invest, circulate and return to origin communities. The non-longitudinal, “snapshot” character of many studies can also lead to potentially misleading conclusions, as the social and economic impact of migration tend to change over time. Migration can diminish agricultural production in the short run through “lost labour” effects and other disruptions created by migration. But migration and remittances may also enhance productivity in the long run through invested remittances after agricultural production systems have

adapted and migrants have settled at the destination and saved sufficient money (Lucas 1987, Taylor 1994). A study of Turkish remittances indicated that while consumption smoothing is the dominant short-run motive for sending remittances, the investment motive is important in the long run (Alper & Neyapti 2006). A study in southern Morocco identified a sequence in which most housing investments occur relatively early in the migration cycle and peak five to 14 years after initial migration. Most agricultural investments occurred from 15 to 24 years after migration, and investments in non-agricultural private businesses peaked from 25 to 29 years after migration (de Haas 2003).

Under highly unfavourable macro-level economic and political conditions, migrants are likely to disinvest in communities of origin, which can indeed set in motion cumulative causation-like processes. On the other hand, if such macro conditions are more favourable or improve over time, if societies stabilize politically and economic growth starts to take off, then migrants are likely to be among the first to join in and recognize such new opportunities, reinforcing these positive trends through investing, circulating and returning to their origin countries. Such turnarounds have happened in the past few decades with several emigration countries as diverse as the South-Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Greece, and might be currently happening in a country like Turkey.

So, migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive investment environments. Depending on the macro-context, effects can both be negative and positive. After all, earnings abroad and remittances not only enable migrants to invest, but also give them and their families the freedom to *disengage* from societies of origin. This exemplifies another shortcoming of cumulative causation theory. By concentrating on the community level it de-contextualises the analysis of migration effects. This might lead to misleading inferences about causality. For instance, the supposed causality of

migration leads to more underdevelopment and, hence, to more migration,

if empirically verified, is in fact a spurious correlation, because both migration and community development are both influenced by structural forces at the macro-level, which micro-level surveys, notwithstanding their many advantages, typically fail to capture. This once again underlines the importance of contextualising the study of internal migration processes.

Third, there is an inherent logical contradiction in the two central arguments that cumulative causation makes: On the one hand, migration is said to breed inequality because migrants come from relatively well-off groups within communities. This assertion is largely consistent with empirical evidence. On the other hand, further impoverishment at the community and regional level is expected to lead to more migration. This is logically inconsistent, as the first argument rightly supposes that a certain threshold of wealth needs to precede migration and the second argument supposes a negative-linear relationship between wealth and migration.

Thus, cumulative causation makes an *inconsistent* analysis of the causes of migration through their selective ignorance of the selective character of migration. This also

reveals that by implicitly assuming that impoverishment leads to more migration, cumulative causation theory implicitly assumes a linear-negative association between “development” or wealth and migration. This is fundamentally at odds with empirical evidence that international migrants generally tend to come neither from the most deprived and isolated communities within countries, nor from the most deprived families within communities. People need certain capabilities and access to resources in order to be able to migrate. Theoretical and empirical evidence on the “migration hump” and migration transitions strongly suggests that the relationship between aspirations and capabilities increasing development and migration is J- or inverted U-curve like rather than linear (de Haas 2007d, Hatton & Williamson 1998, Martin & Taylor 1996, Skeldon 1997, Zelinsky 1971). Such evidence fundamentally contradicts the cumulative causation’s conceptualisation of migration as the result of impoverishment.

This undermines the entire central argument of cumulative causation theory. Most migration seems to result from relative, and not absolute, deprivation and increasing aspirations in combination with substantial spatial opportunity differentials. Even if the feedback dynamics depicted in figure 2 would empirically hold, the systematic impoverishment of sending communities and is rather expected to lead to *decreasing* rather than increasing migration, because less and less people will be able to migrate, in particular when it concerns costly and risky international migration. The true migration paradox is that, besides network effects, positive social and economic impacts of migration which endow people with more resources tend to reinforce their (1) ability and (2) aspirations to migrate, at least initially. Only in the longer term, such positive effects might lead to decreasing migration. Once again, the causalities are fundamentally non-linear.

As with network theory, the circular character of cumulative causation also highlights its inability to conceptualise contextual feedback mechanisms that might counter-act self-reinforcing contextual migration dynamics and, eventually, leading to less migration. The remarkable explanation provided by Massey (1990: 8) beyond network saturation (which is endogenous) was that

“the rate of out-movement ultimately reaches a stage where labor shortages begin to occur and local wages start to rise These developments act to dampen the pressures for additional migration and cause the rate of entry into the migrant work force to decelerate and then to fall of”

this argument is directly drawn from neoclassical migration theory, which expects migration to cause labour to become less scarce at the destination and scarcer at the sending end. Capital is expected to move in the opposite direction. In a perfectly neo-classical world, this process of “factor price equalization” (the Heckscher-Ohlin model) will lead to growing convergence between wages at the sending and receiving end (Harris & Todaro 1970, Lewis 1954, Ranis & Fei 1961, Schiff 1994). In the long run, this process would remove the incentives for migrating. Massey’s neoclassical argument is problematic since it is logically inconsistent with his cumulative causation theory, which predicts divergence instead of convergence. This also illustrates the pitfalls of combining different, fundamentally incommensurate theories. All in all, cumulative causation theory is not only based on a partial understanding of

the forces driving international migration, and cannot explain the crumbling of networks over time.

Another assertion of cumulative causation theory is that migration leads to more migration through remittance-driven increases in income inequality in sending communities. Such impacts are unlikely to be linear, as selectivity of migration selectivity tends to change over time. During the first stages of the evolution of a migration system, selectivity tends to decrease rapidly. Through costs and risks diminishing network effects and the flow back of information relatively less wealthy community members tend to gain increasingly easy access to migration.

As a consequence of this diffusion process, empirical evidence shows that the initially negative effect of remittances on income equality might, therefore, be dampened or even reversed in the long term (Jones 1998, McKenzie & Rapoport 2007), although exact effects are highly contingent on initial migration selectivity (Stark 1988). So, whereas relative deprivation is likely to increase in early stages of migration, it may decrease at later stages. However, inequality may again increase at the “late adopters” stage of migration, when selectivity of migration, other things being equal, tends to increase again (Jones 1998).

4.4. Exogenous factors and their interplay with internal dynamics

It is tempting to attribute the rise and fall of migrant networks and migration systems to exogenous, macro-level factors impacting on migration. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that migration tends to sharply fall if wage and other opportunity differentials between sending and receiving countries fall below a critical threshold level – for wages usually put at a range between 3 and 5 to 1 (Böhning 1994, de Haas 2007d, Martin & Taylor 1996) – provided that the emigration country is growing fast, politically stable and offering hope and opportunity (Martin & Taylor 1996). Beyond that threshold level, the advantages of staying home apparently start to outweigh the costs of migration, and many migrants will effectively return to their origin countries, which then gradually transform into net immigration countries. Such processes have recently occurred in countries as diverse as Spain, Greece, Turkey, South Korea and Taiwan.

Also restrictive emigration and immigration policies – which are typically more successful in authoritarian states such as Cuba and Algeria on the sending end, and Saudi Arabia and Singapore on the receiving end – tend to increase the costs and risks of migration. If marginal increases in externally determined migration costs start to outweigh marginal reduction of migration costs through networks, we might expect a decline of migration and eventual weakening of migrant networks. Collyer challenged existing social network approaches to migration (2005) by how increasingly restrictive immigration policies by the French state has put such pressure on migrant networks that Algerian asylum seekers increasingly migrate to the UK and other destinations, where they do not have family members but which are politically and economically more attractive destinations.

This indicates that advocates of network models may overstate their case when arguing that networks give migration its own, self-perpetuating momentum *independently* of its initial causes. This is at odd with ample evidence that when these causes disappear, migration *does* tend to decline. Declining migration from once-classical emigration countries such as Ireland, Italy, Spain, South-Korea, Taiwan and even Turkey are just a few cases in point. Networks can thus be seen as intermediate factors reducing the costs and risks of migration rather than rendering its fundamental macro-causes irrelevant. This also shows why network theory as such does not necessarily undermine neo-classical explanations of migration.

However, apart from obvious exogenous forces, this paper emphasises that there are also *internal* and *contextual* mechanisms internal to migration processes which may weaken migrant networks and migration systems over time. In contrast to self-sustaining forces, self-undermining internal migration dynamics have received only scant attention in the literature. As far as they have received attention, they have been weakly theorised, let alone incorporated in network and cumulative causation theory in order to make these theories more realistic. However, it is important to do so in view of descriptive evidence that migrants are not necessarily only “bridgeheads” facilitating subsequent migration, but may also become restrictive “gatekeepers” (Böcker 1994, Collyer 2005), being hesitant or unwilling to assist prospective migrants.

There is reason to think that the research focus on transnationalism and networks has contributed to a biased view exaggerating the power and positive virtues of social capital. Most empirical studies are based on case studies which tend to sample on the transnationalism or network variable and are therefore likely to be biased towards immigrants with high levels of transnational orientations and strong network ties. This can easily lead to exaggeration of the proportion of immigrants that maintain intensive transnational ties and identifications through migration networks (see Guarnizo et al 2003), and leaves out of the picture the many instances in which networks do not play an important role or have weakened over time. The following two sections will analyse the various endogenous and contextual mechanisms which might lead to the rise and fall of migration networks and will assess the theoretical implications of these findings.


5. Non-linear and exclusionary endogenous dynamics

5.1. Migration as a diffusion process

Linear and circular interpretations of network and cumulative causation theory are unrealistic because, according to their logic, a whole community should end up at the destination. Massey (1990), Haug (2008) and others have rather conceptualised migration as a diffusion processes which follows a classical S-shaped curve, while the migration rates follow the shape of a bell curve (see figure 3). In this diffusion process, the migration diffusion rate increases slowly, then more strongly, before

declining first at a fast rate then more slowly, until it drops to almost zero and the process comes to a halt (Haug 2008: 152).

Figure 3. Hypothesised migration diffusion (Bell and S curves)



In his hypothesis of the mobility transition, Zelinsky (1971) linked demographic transition theory to the spatial diffusion of innovations, through which he managed to reach a more spatio-temporal understanding of the spread of migration. He conceptualized the demographic transition – in many ways a proxy of modernization – as a process diffusing outward through space and time and linked this process to patterned regularities in the *growth* of personal mobility (Zelinsky 1971: 220-222).

The application of diffusion theory to the study of migrant networks seems useful to explain common empirical patterns in which emigration rates from particular communities is seldom constant and tend to peak and then decline. Everett Rogers (1962), the founder of diffusion theory⁴, proposed that adopters of any new innovation or idea can be categorized as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Rogers argued that people's attitude toward an innovation is a key element in its diffusion. His innovation decision process theory states that innovation diffusion occurs through five successive stages. The innovation-decision process is the process through which people pass (1) first knowledge of an innovation; to (2) forming an attitude toward the innovation; to (3) a decision to adopt or reject; to (4) implementation of the new idea, and to (5) confirmation of this decision.

Applied to migration, pioneer migrants seem to fit within the first category of innovators and, perhaps, early adopters. Generally, empirical evidence suggests that such early migrants tend to be from relatively wealthy (for instance, lower middle class) households, as early migration—analogueous to the adoption and diffusion of a new technology through space and populations—often entails high costs and risks. Network effects diminishing the risks and costs of migration (Bauer & Zimmermann 1998) and facilitating the flow back of information (Korner 1987). Once these costs and risks decrease below a critical threshold level, an increasingly large proportion of the population will be able to migrate, which leads to an exponential growth of migration participation in the next phase.

⁴ Rogers defined diffusion as the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system. Although Rogers developed his theory for the diffusion of innovations, diffusion theory has been widely applied in social science to describe the adoption of new ideas and behaviours throughout human society.

According to diffusion theory, we can expect migration slowing down in the “late adopters” stage. The more contentious points are at which point saturation occurs and the extent to which migration will slow down. Haug (2008) hypothesised that with each new migrant, social capital declines at the place of origin, resulting in an attendant drop in the potential loss of social capital at the place of origin. According to this line of reasoning, however, there would not be a built-in tendency for network migration to slow down beyond a certain point, and we can expect the whole community to end up at the destination.

Empirical evidence strongly suggests that only a minority of community members actually migrates. This can be better explained if we conceive migration as part of broader household strategies to spread income risks and to overcome local market constraints (rather than individual strategies for utility maximisation, as assumed by neo-classical migration theory), as proposed by the new economics of labour migration and other household approaches developed by other social scientists (see de Haas 2007a for an extensive discussion of these approaches).

The spatial risks diversification argument and the desire to invest in origin communities implies that it is generally not in the interest of households that all members end up at the destination, but rather two have one or few “best suited” (generally young) household members to migrate. In addition to household models, human capital theory applied to migration further enables us to theoretically explain the selectivity of migration beyond explanations focusing only on opportunity costs (Bauer & Zimmermann 1998, Sjaastad 1962).

Taking into account individual differences in terms of skills, knowledge, physical abilities, age, sex, and so on, there will also be differences in the extent to which individuals and their households are expected to gain from migrating. Differences in expected returns on migration investments will partly explain diverging propensities across individuals or communities. For instance, human *and* social capital theory provide relatively straightforward explanations why early migrants tend to be young, as they have more expected returns on their human capital and they have invested less in social capital at the origin, and therefore literally less to lose, but they cannot explain

On this basis, we can hypothesise that saturation occurs when most households willing to participate in migration have actually done so. Any further declines in costs and risks through network effects will only allow the few remaining, most deprived members – the late adopters – to migrate. Massey (1990:8) asserted that saturation occurs when

“virtually all households have a close connection to someone with migrant experience . . . When networks reach this level of development, the costs of migration stops falling with each new entrant and the process of migration loses its dynamic”.

Put differently, the returns of network connections on the odds of migrating diminish as migrant communities and network connection grow. These marginal positive returns are large and growing in earlier stages of migration, when the costs and risks

diminishing effects of network lift large sections of sending communities above the threshold at which migration becomes possible. They will diminish when most households have access to migration and migrant network connections have become less scarce. However, we can expect the right tail of the diffusion graph to be less steep and longer than depicted in figure 3, as (family) migration through networks will continue to facilitate migration and as well as the fact that the psychological, social and financial threshold levels for migration to occur will, all other things being equal, have declined.

Diffusion theory when combined with network theory and household approaches to migration decision making is a useful theoretical tool to understand the typical sequences of rising and falling migration rates occurring from specific migrant communities. Saturation is the only endogenous mechanisms identified by conventional network theory to explain *declining* networks migration over time. However, there are a number of conceptual caveats.

First, the theory implicitly assumes that migration is a anomalous, new behaviour, which in its turn is based on the “myth of the immobile peasant” (Skeldon 1997: 7-8) and the implicit assumption that pre-modern societies consisted of relatively isolated, stable, static, homogeneous peasant communities, in which migration was fairly exceptional. This is generally consistent with historical evidence. So, it is not migration that is new, it is rather new (international) destinations and its association with modern wage labour and capitalist economies that constitute the main “innovation” of contemporary migration. So, as much as there was not “beginning” of migration, we should not assume an “end” of migration at the right hand side of the bell curve, it rather represents a deceleration of migration to that particular destination. Second, application of this theory should not lead to dogmatic, teleological views of migration stages communities “have to” go through. Empirical realities tend to depart from this ideal type, in particular if exogenous economic and political conditions (which are assumed constant) change.

More fundamentally problematic is the assumption that “over time migration spreads outward to encompass *all* segments of society” (Massey 1990: 8, emphasis by author). From empirical studies, we know that this is typically *not* the case. As any society, migrant sending societies tend to be socially and ethnically stratified. This also means that group boundaries may impede the diffusion of the migration experience across communities. Instead of spreading to *all* segments of society, migration tends to be a socially stratified process. This will inevitably lead to a more critical discussion of the fundamentally mixed blessings of social capital in migration processes.

5.2. The downsides of migratory social capital


Social capital in the form of strong kinship and social bonds can greatly facilitate the migration of group members, but the flipside of the coin is that such strong community bonds *also* tend to exclude outsiders from access to migration. In communities where social organization and trust are mainly based on kinship ties, these bonds were also the main channel for gaining access to international migration, either through marriage, assistance with securing visas, financing irregular migration,

finding work and housing, and so on. Moreover, migrants, including their children, tend to prefer to marry partners within their own extended family or the own ethnic lineage.

For instance, my doctoral fieldwork in southern Morocco revealed that in the six communities surveyed, selectivity of access to international migration to Europe had not decreased over the past decades, which is conflicting with the predictions of network theory (de Haas 2003). Data analysis revealed a high differentiation in migration participation across different lineages (*ighsan*) within the same village and across villages. Some (extended families within) lineages are far more heavily involved in international migration than others are, and migrants from the same lineage tend to be concentrated in specific destinations. Out of the 35 different lineages included in the survey, only 7 contained more than 50 percent of all current international migrants.

A Gini-index based analysis of the distribution of international migrants at the lineage level, differentiating between migrants who left before and since 1980, indicated that the degree of inequality of international migration participation measured at the lineage level had remained virtually constant. This suggests that inequality in access to international migration has not decreased, and that “international migration capital” has remained concentrated within certain lineages. The importance of such kinship networks has become even more important due to the increasing legal barriers to migration. Moreover, ethnic lineages—and extended families within them—tend to keep the “migration capital” within their own group through endogamous marriage (de Haas 2003, de Haas 2006).

Figure 4. Lorenz curves for participation in international migration at lineage level before and since 1980, Todgha oasis, Morocco



Source: de Haas 2003. Gini index: 0.463 (before 1980) and 0.471 (after 1980).

Thus, kinship-based access to migrant networks can also lead to inequality in access to such networks. This also explains why the supposed “diffusion” of migration within communities—as predicted by migration network theory and transitional models—remained largely limited to particular lineages and extended families within them which monopolize access to international migration. So, the predicted spread “to all segments of society” (Massey 1990: 8) did not occur. In southern Morocco, such

patterns are repeated at the local and regional level, with certain villages, towns, oases or valleys having much higher levels of international migration participation than others, and with each locality being highly “specialized” on migration to one or two particular destinations in Europe. Such spatially concentrated and bundled nature of migration patterns have for also been described for historical migration from southern Italy to the US (MacDonald & MacDonald 1964), migration within Africa (Mabogunje 1970) and seem in fact rather typical for migration occurring from traditional societies.

This also explains why ethnic groups and/or regions which are excluded from existing networks and/or not incorporated in established migration systems tend to develop distinct migration patterns. In southern Morocco, for instance, the peasant populations of certain oases have heavily participated in migration to France and the Netherlands since the mid 1960s. While more marginal, often semi-nomadic ethnic groups (such as the Ait Atta of the Saghro mountains) tended to be excluded from such migration, but have been at the forefront of exploring new migration destinations in Spain since the 1990s (de Haas 2003).

Although kinship networks tend to be of great help for insiders, they also tend to be exclusionary for outsiders. This points at the “downside of social capital”. This concept was coined by Portes and Landolt (1996) and further elaborated by Portes (1998) in his seminal paper on the origins and applications of social capital. Portes introduced this concept to criticize uncritical and fashionable applications which celebrate social capital as a “key to success and development”. As Portes argues, popular views now portray social capital as wholly beneficial with no significant downside, and thereby naively assume that social capital can resolve the classic dilemmas of collective action. However, as Portes (1998) argued, social capital does have also has at least four possible negative implications:

1. *Restricted access to opportunities through exclusion*: The same strong ties that bring benefits to members of a group often enable to exclude outsiders (Portes 1998: 18, Portes & Landolt 1996: 3);
2. *Excessive claims on group members*: Tight social networks and obligations may undermine individual economic initiatives through pressing social obligations and excessive claims on such successful individuals to support family and community members.
3. *Restrictions in individual freedom*: Community or group membership creates demands for conformity, which can be asphyxiating to the individual spirit. A high level of social control can also be quite restrictive of personal freedoms.
4. *Downward levelling norms*: Particularly if group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and discrimination by mainstream society, individual success stories undermine group cohesion “because the latter is precisely grounded in the alleged impossibility of such occurrences” (Portes 1998: 17). This may lead to the emergence of downward levelling norms that keep members of a group in place and force the more ambitious to escape from it.

This paper argues that these four “downsides” of social capital as identified by Portes can be successfully applied to the study of the internal dynamics of migration processes. Incorporation of these negative forms of social capital in our conceptual

framework will enable to improve insight in the internal dynamics that may effectively block or gradually undermine self-perpetuating migration dynamics described above. In the next section we will limit the discussion to the first, exclusionary, downside of social capital, as it is the most relevant to the study of *endogenous* internal dynamics operating through migrant networks. The other three downsides rather refer to contextual effects, and will therefore be discussed in subsequent, relevant sections.

5.3. The exclusionary dynamics of migrant networks

In the arena of migration research, social capital in the form of access to migrant networks tends to be invariably seen as an unmixed blessing facilitating the migration of more and more community members. However, such reasoning is not only circular, but also largely ignores the internal socio-ethnic differentiation of migrant sending communities. Migration networks may be to the benefit of people belonging to the (extended) families, ethnic groups or communities containing international migrants, but they also entail the exclusion of those outside these groups. In southern Morocco, for instance, predominantly kinship-based nature of access to migrant networks implies that although current migrants may indeed act as “bridgeheads” for prospective migrants within the same family and lineage, they also act as “gatekeepers”, who are unwilling to assist non-kin or only agree to do so in return for a high (bride) price.

This also highlights the importance of decomposing social capital into (1) the social relationship itself and (2) the amount and quality of resources that can be accessed through such relationships. As Portes (1998) argued as well, this distinction was essential in Bourdieu’s original definition of social capital (see paragraph 2.2), but these two elements have unfortunately been confounded in much of the later literature, such as is for instance evident in Coleman’s (1988) and Putnam’s (2000) influential interpretations of the concept. As has been argued by Portes, the inherent danger of such analytical fuzziness is tautological reasoning. After all, “defining social capital as equivalent with the resources thus obtained is tantamount to saying that the *successful succeed*” (Portes 1998: 5; emphasis added). This criticism can be directly applied to the literature on migration networks: Strong social networks only facilitate migration if members of such networks have access to *resources* facilitating such migration. Networks can be highly useful, but are, as such, neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for migration to occur.

Defining capital as “accumulated labor”, Bourdieu (1985: 241) emphasized that the different forms of capital are fungible. This implies that economic, human⁵, social and cultural capital can be partly converted into each other. So, social capital in the form of migrant networks can be a useful resource enabling people to migrate and, hence, potentially gain access to economic, cultural and cultural capital. However, strong social connections *as such* do not enable migration. Networks do not automatically lead to more migration, because it requires that migrants are both (1) willing to help

⁵ Bourdieu (1979; 1985) did not use the term human capital, but this concepts seems to be more or less included in his definition of cultural capital (see also Portes 1998).

prospective migrants and (2) capable to mobilize the resources needed to facilitate migration.

Impoverished migrants, for instance, might simply not been *able* to deliver “network help” if they lack the resources to do so. At the same time, people lacking strong social connections to migrants but possessing high economic, human and cultural capital will often still be able to migrate without the help of others, because they can more easily access visas, are generally better informed about migration opportunities and have the financial means to assume the opportunity and actual costs of migrating. So, networks are certainly not a necessary condition for migration to occur.

We can therefore hypothesize that *relatively* poor, low skilled migrants are generally more dependent on social capital in the form of networks in order to migrate than wealthy, high skilled migrants. This is consistent with ample evidence of the clustered nature of migration of low skilled migration as well as their more segregated settlement patterns as opposed to the more individualized and more spatially diffuse and less geographically concentrated nature of high skilled migration. This also shows that we should not overstate the importance of networks in migration processes.

Thus, while networks tend to be particularly crucial for facilitating migration of relatively poor people, this very dependence on networks also implied that relatively poor people lacking access to such networks can be effectively *excluded* from migration. This can lead to situations of “involuntary immobility” (Carling 2002), in particular in communities where the contextual effects of large-scale emigrations have increased people’s aspirations to migrate, but where access to international mobility has become more costly and selective through the implementation of increasingly restrictive immigration policies by destination countries. Such situations of involuntary immobility through exclusion of access to migratory resources among the relatively deprived have been described in several origin countries of immigrants in Europe, such as Cape Verde (Carling 2002), Mali (Jónsson 2008) and Morocco (de Haas 2003). As we will see in section 6.5, under such circumstances, diseconomies of scale of migrant networks through increasing competition for jobs and pressure on wages might further decrease the willingness and ability of settled migrants to provide migration assistance.


Particularly, in the case of “South-North” international migration, where financial resources mobilized through migration (remittances) can substantially increase the wealth of migrant families, these exclusionary mechanisms can lead to new inequalities. In southern Morocco, international migration has given rise to new socio-economic divides between families and lineages with and without access to international migration and remittances, which have been largely superimposed upon the traditional forms of structural, hereditary inequality based on kinship, complexion and land ownership. Sustained inequality between international migration “haves” and “have-nots” is reinforced by the mainly kinship-based access to migration networks (de Haas 2003, de Haas 2006). This exemplifies that migrant networks are a double-edged sword which include some, but therefore inevitably exclude others. “Sociability cuts both ways”, to speak with Portes (1998: 18). The more closed communities and (ethnic) groups and the higher the migration costs (such as through restrictive immigration policies) the stronger these hypothesized exclusionary effects will be.

6. The rise and fall of migration systems

Conventional theories on the internal dynamics of migration processes are excellent in explaining the expansion of already established migrant network and migration systems, but fail to analytically capture their creation and demise. While the exclusionary mechanisms of networks in closed kinship and social groups help to explain the limited spread of the migration experience to outsiders, it is also important to theorise the factors explaining why only a small minority of initial migration moves result in the creation of migrant networks and migration systems through a more or less systematic flow of people, information goods and money between places.

The implicit assumption is often that network effects immediately start to work with the departure of the first migrants. However, network theorists like Massey rightly claim that a certain critical number of migrants need to have settled at the destination before network forces come into play. A certain “critical mass” before positive effects of spatial clustering and economics of scale start to give migration processes their own momentum. After all, an uncritical application of network theory predicts that all individual moves by should lead to large-scale migration. This illustrates the need to improve insights in the processes that precede the establishment of migration systems, *before* networks gain their self-reinforcing internal dynamics.

Figure 5. Ideal typical scenarios of migration to a particular destination



It is equally important to theorise why the self-reinforcing internal migration dynamics tend to first gain and then gradually lose their momentum and can even

become self-undermining over time. While most endogenous and contextual effects of migration tend to self-reinforce migration processes during the early adopter and early majority phases of migration, these effects are typically generally not linear. Conventional network and cumulative causation is unable to explaining why settled migrants and their descendants often transform from “bridgeheads” into increasingly selective “gatekeepers”. To explain these self-reinforcing and self-undermining dynamics, it is useful to distinguishing between the role of (1) migration-related information flowing back to sending communities; (2) actual assistance in the process of migrating; and (3) assistance in the settlement process. Whereas the second effect is mainly endogenous, the first and the last effects mainly operate on the contextual level at the sending and receiving ends, respectively.

This section will propose an ideal-typical conceptual framework analysing the processes various processes and relationships which explain the *heterogeneous* rise and fall of migration systems across space and time. This framework, which is depicted in figure 5, will be based on the notion of migration as a spatio-temporal diffusion process, but will be amended with various theoretical insights discussed in the paper. Because of significant data gaps, this exercise is primarily meant to provide a set of hypotheses, which will need further verification and modification through qualitative and quantitative empirical research.

6.1. Migration as innovation: pioneer migration

Under different guises, the migration literature has made a classic distinction between pioneer and chain migrants. The geographer Hägerstrand (1957) distinguished active and passive migrants. In the same vein, Petersen (1958) distinguished innovating and conservative migration. MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) described chain migration from Italy to the US as a process involving three stages: (1) pioneer migration of “padroni”, (2) labour migration through larger community networks, and (3) family migration through family reunification and marriages between migrant men and Italian-born brides. Pioneer migrants are unlikely to be among the poorest community members. In his study on Italians migration to Chicago, Vecoli (1964) showed that the original pioneer Italian immigrants to Chicago tended to be merchants rather than peasants.

While the structural factors which tend to encourage migration (such as opportunity differentials, infrastructure development or violent conflict) are well documented, the processes which actually trigger initial migration moves are less well known. Explanations why particular individuals within communities explore new migration itineraries and “spontaneously” appear destinations are generally less satisfactory, and rarely go beyond bringing in rather obscure factors such as coincidence or luck. However, even in the case of labour recruitment or conflict-induced migration there is usually a degree of agency involved. This is why we would need a more sociologically founded explanation of early migration processes.

Negative social capital is often a major cause of pioneer migration. It has been frequently observed that pioneer migrants, are often rather non-conformist individuals. This is a general attribute of innovators, as the adoption of new ideas and

behaviours often implies violating social norms and therefore requires a certain independent spirit. After all, people's attitude toward an innovation is a key element in its diffusion (Rogers 1962). This also shows that the second and third forms of negative social capital – excessive claims on group members and restrictions on individual freedom – can explain why pioneer migrants tend to be slightly non-conformist and entrepreneurial community members. As Portes (1998: 16) pointed out, a high level of social control can also be quite restrictive of personal freedoms, “which is the reason the young and more independent minded have always left”. Migration can then be particularly attractive option because it enables individuals to place themselves out of the social context. This seems particularly true for politically motivated migration For the case of Algerian asylum seekers, Collyer (2005) described how the presence of co-nationals at a particular destination might be a *disincentives* to settle there, as escaping control is the very reason behind their migration.

Thus, there is a danger *automatically* conceiving migration as an act of group solidarity or as part of household or family strategies to increase or diversify household income, as has been the overall tendency in the migration literature, and in particular under influence of the new economics of labour migration. Although these approaches were a highly welcome departure from neo-classical, individualistic cost-benefit approaches, this brings the danger of reifying the household or family as a harmonious unit with a clear will, plans, strategy, and aims; and leaves no place for dissent, conflict and the desire to escape. In particular pioneer migration can under certain circumstances be motivated by the very will to *escape* from asphyxiating and oppressive kinship and community bonds. This explains why those pioneer migrants whose act of migrating was motivated by the very wish to escape often do not maintain intensive social and financial ties. This seems particularly true in the early phases of migration. Once established, financially secure and socially independent, pioneer migrants might however renew such bonds at later stages of the life cycle (cf. Stockdale 2002).

6.2. Early adopters: Chain migration and herd effects

Pioneer migrants tend to end up in a range of destinations while others return, but only a small minority of such moves will eventually result in network migration to destination. If pioneer migrants settle at the destination, limited chain migration⁶ of close family members or friends might follow, after which migration largely ceases. This most common scenario of countless initial migration moves that never result in take-off migration is represented by line A in figure 5. This is the *normal* pattern.

But the crucial question remains: What explains the selective evolution of only few of such initial moves into take-off network migration and full-blown migration systems?

⁶ We define chain migration as the migration of direct kind family members of initial migrants to distinguish it from network migration, where endogenous externalities and contextual internal effect start to play a role beyond the hypothesised “threshold” level at which migration becomes a self-reinforcing social and economic process. Migration chains then refer to direct, vertical family ties, whereas networks suppose transversal connections between such migratory family chains both at the community level at both the origin and the destination.

To understand the growth and clustering of migration flows to particular destination *before* they the network threshold level is reached, it is useful to draw on Epstein's (2008) distinction between (1) *herd* and (2) *network* effects.

In brief, herd effects entail discounting private information to follow others. There is a substantial literature on herd effects. While the theory of information cascades has been applied to the explanation of behaviour in several contexts, Epstein (2002, 2008) has successfully applied this concept to migration. The idea is that those without information about destinations will migrate to where most initial migrants have gone to. If full information on all possible destinations is not available – the implicit assumption of push-pull and other neoclassical place utility models which obviously never applies – migration choices are made under conditions of uncertainty. It is then a fully rational choice by new migrants to follow previous migrants on the supposition that previous emigrants enjoyed information that they did not have and that so many other people cannot be wrong (Epstein 2008: 569). Even those without information on alternative location will therefore often choose the location where most prior migrants have gone to. So, initial choices by some pioneer migrants to maintain contact and to facilitate migration of some family members and friends can become self-reinforcing through these herd effects, well *before* the network threshold level is reached.

Herd behaviour is an endogenous effect because the migrant behaviour of group members directly affects the migration decision of other individuals. In particular, this will also encourage community members outside their direct circle to migrate before network effects come into play. It is important to emphasise that at this stage, the role of social capital mainly confined to family support used in enabling chain migration of direct kin, and does not significantly extend to wider network effects yet. As more individuals migrate, unobserved conditions at the destination are further reduced (Radu 2008), leading to an increasing clustering around a few specific destinations typical for emigration communities. Obviously, such herd behaviour will only occur if people expect to benefit from migration.

Due to the increasing concentration on and selection of destinations, most herd behaviour will be limited and will never reach the network threshold level. This pattern of “failed migration systems” is represented by line B in figure 5. Only a few initial clusters will reach the threshold level at which positive network externalities start to make the process self-reinforcing. Theoretically, even rather tiny initial leads in number of migrant at a particular destination will be magnified many times through the increasing clustering of migration through herd effects. This also explains why factors such as labour recruitment, even if the number of migrants recruited is fairly limited, are often crucial factors in giving this initial advantage to particular destination to trigger self-reinforcing herd effects or, in some more exceptional cases, pushing the number of migrants at a particular destination beyond that threshold level, triggering self-reinforcing network dynamics.

6.3. Take-off migration: Mutually reinforcing network externalities and contextual impacts

Once the number of migrants at a particular destination has reached a certain critical level at which positive network externalities occur, migration processes become self-reinforcing. At least four conditions need to be met for such effects to occur. First, pioneer migrants need to send back information on their place of destination and migration experiences. Second, they need to be clustered at the destination to a certain extent. Third, they need to be willing to accommodate the migration of others. And last but not least, exogenous macro-factors have to enable and inspire people to migrate.

Networks not only facilitate migration to a particular destination but also facilitate settlement and adjustment to a new location by providing migrants access to local resources. Beneficial network externalities arise when the stock of migrants is sufficiently large to provide accommodation and work, other economic assistance and reduce the stress of cultural adaptation (Epstein 2008). While networks decrease the costs and risks of migration, positive network externalities and economies of scale created around immigrant clusters make the destination more and more attractive for new migrants, which make an increasing number of migrants gravitating to that particular destination, and so on.

In addition, the spatial clustering of migrants in enclaves in particular towns or neighbourhoods, the rising demand for immigrant-specific products and the related rise of “ethnic” entrepreneurship tend to create a high specialised demand for co-ethnic workers, such as cooks, halal or kosher butchers, bakers and confectioners, hairdressers, interpreters, teachers, and clergymen. In addition to network effects, this creates an autonomous demand for co-ethnic workers from the same origin (cf. Castles & Miller 2003, Portes et al 2002). Again, a certain degree of spatial clustering in specific neighbourhoods seems a prerequisite for such network externalities, which is more often the case for low skilled and/or closed ethnic or religious migrant groups.

Also in mainstream business and the civil service, ethnic niches emerge when a group is able to colonize a particular sector of employment in such a way that members monopolise access to new job openings, while restricting that of outsiders. Examples cited by Portes (1998) range from restaurant work and garment factories all the way to police and fire departments and certain branches of the New York and Miami civil services. This can explain why entry-level job openings are frequently filled by kin and friends in remote foreign locations rather than by available local workers (Portes 1998). More generally, the segmented nature of labour markets often lead to such specific, semi-autonomous demand, in particular for irregular workers in agriculture, construction, domestic and other unskilled services (de Haas 2008).


Also at the sending end, several endogenous and contextual effects explain why migration can become self-reinforcing. While the flow back of remittances often finance the migration of other family and community members, the initially inequality increasing effects of remittances is likely to increase feelings of relative deprivation among nonmigrants and, hence, increase their aspirations to migrate. Social remittances in the form of flows of ideas, behaviours, and (transnational) identities are

likely to reciprocally reinforce these processes and contribute to an increasingly outward looking mentality or even a “culture of migration”, in which increasing prestige is attached to migration, which can become a social norm or even *rite de passage*.

To varying degrees, and primarily depending on the more general, exogenously given investment environment, remittance-triggered local consumption and investment in houses and private enterprises stimulate local economic growth and are likely to provide employment and income to nonmigrants too. The same applies for local wage increases resulting from migration. This will enable an increasing share of the population to reach the threshold level at which they can assume the costs and risks of migration. However, such diffusion will be fundamentally limited if strong bonding social capital if certain classes or ethnic groups coincides with the exclusion of outsiders.

At the same time the latter costs and risks are falling through network effects, exemplifying how the internal dynamics at the sending and receiving end tend to reinforce each other during the phase of take-off migration. As long as people’s aspirations faster than increases in local opportunities, these feedback mechanisms at the contextual level will spur migration, while positive impacts of migration and remittances on local income growth actually enable them to do so. The ideal-typical evolution of average community-level capabilities and aspirations to migrate over the different migration stages are depicted in figure 6. This is a rather different perspective than the more pessimistic view associated to cumulative causation, which tend to see migration as the result of impoverishment and “uprooting” through global capitalist forces.

Figure 6. Ideal-typical evolution of average community-level capabilities and aspirations to migrate



A *certain* level of spatial clustering at the destination seems to be a prerequisite to generate the threshold externalities necessary to make the transfer from chain to network migration, which to a certain extent becomes self-reinforcing. This happens when a sufficient number of migrants have started to independently establish ties so as to create a sense of community at the destination. This is also the point where contextual, second round effects will come into play. A recent national survey among rural Mexican households showed that community and family networks are substitutes in facilitating migration, but that, once migration is well established in a community, family networks become less important and community networks become more important (Winters et al 2001). The study also revealed that the development of strong community networks decreases the role of household characteristics in migration, allowing those initially least favoured to also participate in migration. While this is consistent with the diffusion hypothesis, it points at the importance of disentangling chain and network migration.

Spatial clustering and, hence, network effects are most likely to occur in the case of relatively low skilled migrants. Although high skilled migration can generate substantial chain migration, network migration is likely to be less important, and they are therefore much more likely to follow scenario B. Migrants without kinship ties are also more likely to assimilate. Choldin (1973) already showed that migrants *without* kinship ties find work quicker, feel less homesick and may make a more rapid socio-psychological adjustment, exactly because they cannot rely on kin. High skilled migrants generally rely less on social networks to migrate, are less geographically concentrated (Epstein 2008), will have less social and cultural adjustment problems, will find (formal) employment more easily, and are therefore more likely to develop ties with native and other immigrant populations.

It may be clear now that network migration in fact is fairly exceptional. So, why and how do only some small clusters of family migration *chains* eventually evolve into community wide migration *networks* and local and regional migration systems? Because of the pivotal role of *information* in pre-network migration, it is useful to apply Granovetter's (1973) hypothesis of the "strength of weak ties". He criticized conventional social network models for confining their applicability to small, well-defined groups, by stressing the cohesive power of weak ties. Granovetter argued that the degree of overlap of two individuals' networks and, hence, information, correlates positively with the strength of their tie to one another.

Paradoxically, diffusion of new information, opportunities and behaviours are therefore more likely to enter groups through "no strong ties" or "bridges", which provide the links between primary groups (Granovetter 1973: 1364). His hypothesis has led to the conventional distinction now being in the literature between bonding and bridging social capital. Bridging capital in particular is thereby believed to increase community cohesion and the spread of information and innovative ideas and behaviours. So, while Portes (1998) pointed out that strong intra-community ties tend to exclude outsiders, we may add that the reverse applies as well: Strong bonding and weak bridging social capital tends to exclude *insiders* from new information and ideas. We can define this as the fifth downside of social capital.

Applied to migration, this means that information on new destinations is more likely to spread through relative distant connections than through very close contacts. From this, we can hypothesise that the more closed and isolated social groups are (i.e., groups with strong bonding and weak bridging social capital), the lower their participation to migration will be. Groups which combine strong bonding with strong bridging capital are more likely to migrate, but they are more likely to concentrate at in particular enclaves at the destination. This will create externalities that will be of great benefit of group members. Yet, this will also coincide with exclusion of outsiders and, hence, a lower degree of diffusion of migration participation across communities and regions in origin countries.

In particular, this seems to apply for tightly knit ethnic and religious groups specialising in special trades, such as the Mourid Sufi brotherhood in Senegal, who have developed vibrant and highly successful global trading and migration networks (cf. Stoller 1996). Through trading, they tend to be well informed and economically successful, but they strongly resist assimilation. This perhaps also applies to the transatlantic networks of Hasidic Jews resulting from late 19th century migration from Eastern Europe to the US (cf. Poll 1969). If such transnational networks linking migrants from the same (imagined or real) motherland across several destinations are sustained over generations, migrant groups may eventually become “diasporic” (Cohen 1997).

Transnational social ties within such communities tend to be very close and can easily transferred to other generations, but are less likely to be extended to non-members than looser migrant groups. So, this will lead to little diffusion outside the group which is necessary for large-scale network migration to occur. On the one hand, closed groups will facilitate the creasing of clusters (in immigrant neighbourhoods) at the destination generating positive network externalities facilitating more migration. On the other hand, it is exactly the closed nature of these groups which will impede the diffusion of migration outside the group boundaries. Thus, large-scale migration diffusion through network effects seems most likely to occur among relative poor, low skilled migrant groups with a “moderate” level of group identity, cohesion and “strong ties”, which should be strong enough to guarantee clustering and prevent rapid assimilation, but also loose en open enough so that group norms do not prevent the establishment of “weak ties”.

This perspective also makes it possible to make a link between cultural and social change to explain how modernisation-affected cultural change in the form of loosening group ties and growing connectedness to the outside world can be a cause of migration. In southern Morocco, for instance, sedentary peasant populations of relatively well-connected oases, which were exposed to the influences of the French colonial state relatively early by forces of colonisation, modernization and education, participated earlier and more intensively in international migration than sedentary and semi-nomadic people living in isolated areas in the Atlas mountains (de Haas 2003).

This was not only related to the slightly greater wealth of people living in these “moderately marginal” areas, but also to their connectedness to the outside world and the fact that modernization processes had affected these areas earlier. Modernization as embodied by improving infrastructure and transportation links, increased mobility, education and the influence of mass media, and demographic transitions had spurred

family nucleation and individualisation processes in “moderately marginal” agrarian communities relatively early . The increased exposure to the outside world and other ways of life increased the aspirations of young people, which can typically not be met locally. The isolation and stronger tribal cohesion of ethnic groups such as the Aït Atta and their inward orientation explains their low propensity to participate in internal and international migration. Again, such evidence contradicts common views (which are ultimately based on neo-Marxist and dependency theory) which primarily see migration as the result of marginalisation and, subsequently, impoverishment. In fact, the most marginal and excluded groups simply did *not* migrate internationally.

This gives another twist to the notion that modernisation and capitalist expansion “uproot” rural populations. This notion is not new but still rather prevalent. Most explanations focus on economic aspects and are cast within a neo-Marxist perspective of marginalisation of (rural) communities through their inclusion in the capitalist economy and the subsequent undermining of traditional economies. However, the common idea that migration is the result of *impoverishment* (i.e., growing poverty) is conflicting with empirical evidence that most international migration does not occur from the poorest “margin of the margin” communities, as migration not only requires a certain threshold level of wealth, but also the necessary aspirations and “weak” social connections.

The relevance of rising aspirations in explaining mounting desires to emigrate can hardly be overestimated. This might explain why international migration propensities are often particularly high in “moderately marginal” areas and towns in middle income countries such as Morocco and Mexico, where modernizing cultural influences are fundamentally changing local culture, loosening community ties, but where local or even national opportunities cannot meet surging aspirations. Communities who do not resist cultural change, and whose younger members are rapidly expanding their imaginative and geographical horizons, and are often better culturally and socially connected to the outside world through education, travel and – last but not least – internal migration, are therefore particularly prone to migrate internationally too.

This also leads to more neutral and contextualised neutral reading of the “culture of migration” (see section 3.5), which is mostly seen as endogenous to migration processes, thereby potentially overlooking broader transformation processes to which it is intrinsically connected. There is reason to criticize the uncritical way in which the culture of migration is often assumed to be just “there” (for an example, see Heering et al 2004). Besides this danger of reification, the research focus on migration can easily lead to overestimating its importance. The term is potentially misleading in suggesting that migration is the main causes of socio-cultural change. It is important to recognize that migration *itself* is constituent part of a complex set of social, cultural and economic transformations, as well as an independent factor in perpetuating and probably intensifying, magnifying and accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels.

Rogers (1962) argued that people’s attitude toward an innovation is a key element in its diffusion, and migration does not seem an exception. Other processes, such as improved education, increasing exposure to electronic media, improved infrastructure and tourism also play a key role in broadening people’s horizons, changing their

attitudes and raising their aspirations. Since these changes are part of more general and universal processes, a ‘culture of migration’ is perhaps not the most appropriate term to use. More in general, the expectation and acceptance of the need for young adults to leave rural areas is rather universal in modern societies (cf. Stockdale 2002), and certainly not limited to poor countries.

There is often a strong rationale underlying migration aspirations. The literature has interpreted cultures of migration in an overly negative way, and has generally done so with strong moral overtones, reflecting a belief that the “good life” can best be achieved “at home” and that migration is an indicator of development failure (Bakewell 2007). This view is intrinsic to cumulative causation theory. However, migration has always been a strategy used by people to try to improve their quality of life. The life of subsistence farmers is often harsh and may offer few chances for improvements over the generations (Bakewell 2007). In southern Morocco, for instance, migration has been a liberating experience for the *haratin*, a subaltern group of Black sharecroppers and (former) slaves, and has been their main avenue to upward socio-economic mobility (de Haas 2006).

6.4. From bridgeheads to gatekeepers: Migration weakening contextual dynamics

Once set in motion, the self and mutually reinforcing internal dynamics at the sending and receiving end become so powerful that this creates a strong own momentum. However, the core of our argument is that these self-reinforcing mechanisms are not linear. In particular endogenous and contextual network effects tend to increase exponentially in the “early majority” phase due to economies of scale and agglomeration effects. However, once networks reach a certain size and maturity, marginal positive externalities tend to decrease and diseconomies of scale might occur through increasing competition for jobs and other resources.

Epstein (2008) hypothesised two opposing effects resulting from the increase of the size of networks. The first effect is direct and increases the migrants’ benefits from the network. The second is negative via the decrease of wages, which decreases the migrant’s benefits. Initially, both new migrants and settled migrants benefit from network growth through mutual support and economies of scale involved in growing migrant clusters. However, these advantages tend to decrease over time, and at the point that the marginal costs for the existing migrants start to exceed the benefits, then the existing migrants become less likely to wish more migrants to join them (Epstein 2008: 573). This suggests that the networks externalities are not linearly positive, and that the probability of an individual migrating to a particular destination has an inverse U-shape relationship, with regard to the stock of immigrants already in the host country (Epstein 2008: 573). This has been verified empirically in surveys conducted among Mexican migrants in the US (Bauer et al 2000) and among migrants from the Soviet Union to Israel (cited in Epstein 2008).

If the number of immigrants increase, there is potentially more competition for jobs, which potentially lowers immigrants’ wages. Such negative network externalities may eventually cause the attractiveness of a destination to decrease (Epstein 2008). This

seems to be corroborated by macro-economic evidence suggesting that whereas immigration often has a positive, albeit small impact on total economic growth, it may have adverse effect effects on lowest income earners, often (former) immigrants themselves (WorldBank 2005). This also rationalises the empirical phenomenon that established migrants and their children are often in favour of more immigration restrictions (ref). In particular if immigration is subject to adverse selection, high-productive immigrants do not want low-productive people to immigrate (Epstein 2008, Stark 1991). Hence, migrants may gradually transform from “bridgeheads” facilitating subsequent migration to restrictive “gatekeepers” (Böcker 1994).

In addition, once immigrant population reaches a particular size and maturity, and second and even third generations start to come of age, relations can become more impersonal, explaining why “the arrival of someone from ‘back home’ may not evoke the same feeling of responsibility and benevolence. Network externalities can, therefore, be subject to diseconomies of size of the immigrant population. After a sufficiently long presence, a local individualistic culture can take hold” (Epstein 2008: 580). Although migrants and their descendents maintain a strong attachment to their homeland – a tendency which is facilitated by the media and infrastructure revolutions – such attachment *tends* to become more transnational in character and less tied to direct kinship relations and implicit social contracts with family “back home”.

Collyer’s (2005) more analysis of the spatial reorientation of recent Algerian asylum seeker migration from France to new destinations such as the UK also fits into Epstein’s scheme. Collyer described a pattern in which settled family members started to avoid claims on their assistance and also migrants actively sought new destinations, thereby mainly drawing on “weak” links. This process was accelerated by the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the French state, which has put additional pressure on assistance by settled migrants, which they are increasingly unwilling to provide giving the high risks and costs and the limited benefits they can expected to reap from such arrangements.

Such striking diversification in migration away from the classical destination countries towards new destinations such as Italy, Spain, Canada and the US has also occurred for Moroccan migration (de Haas 2007b). Such shifts, which cannot be explained by conventional network theory, might be explained by the maturing of migrant networks, the diseconomies of scale, gradual detachment and increasing avoidance of claims making this involves. Long-term network contraction and breakdown is particularly likely to happen if (1) migrant communities start experience socio-economic mobility, usually coinciding with increasing assimilation and geographical dispersal; (2) if severe legal migration restrictions increase costs of migration and the claims put upon settled migrants or if (3) opportunity gaps with origin and destination countries are significantly reduced. Under the first and/or second conditions, migration flows are less likely to decrease but will rather shift to new destinations. This combination of internal (contextual) and external dynamics might explain why most “post-colonial” migration has experienced a significant and largely unattended spatial diversification over the past two decades.

Herd effects as modelled by Epstein (2002, 2008) occur because individuals observe and copy others’ behaviour. Herd effects continue to be self-reinforcing and may at least initially continue to motivate new migrants to move to the initial destination

even after conditions at the destination have deteriorated. This implies that people may continue to migrate to a particular place even when more desirable locations are available, in particular when no information on such destinations is available. This again exemplifies the importance of weak ties in discovering and exploring new destinations by pioneer migrants. However, because of the decreasing willingness of settled migrants to facilitate their migration, less will be able to do so. From this, we can hypothesise that in the phases of network contraction and breakdown, network migration will largely cease and most “late majority” and “laggards” migrants will move through family chain migration channels.

Table 2. Hypothesised effects of migrants’ group cohesion, human capital and migration costs on internal migration dynamics

		Networks	
		<i>Many bonding ties, low skilled</i>	<i>Many bridging ties, high skilled</i>
Migrant costs (distance, infrastructure, policies)	<i>Low</i>	Initially strong clustering, after which intra-community diffusion occurs through ‘herd’ and ‘network’ effects, transfer of family to community networks; declining relevance of networks over time	Networks less important, low spatial clustering, spatially diffuse flows, rapid diffusion of migration through spread of information
	<i>High</i>	Extremely clustered flows perpetuated over long time periods, limited diffusion, highly facilitating for members, but highly and increasingly exclusionary for non-members.	Importance of networks at family and friends level (chain migration), rapidly declining over time

Although the declining, right-hand tail of figure 5 is likely to occur, it is not inevitable, as is testified by some migration networks and systems which survived several generations. As has been argued, some tightly-knit ethnic and religious groups living in enclaves are an exception to this rule, and might sustain close transnational kinship relations over many generations, which can become truly “diasporic”, in the way Cohen (1997) defined them. However, most immigrant groups do not seem to follow this trajectory, and in particular the second and third generation do tend to integrate or assimilate into mainstream society to a high enough degree to stop most network migration. Even when this is in the form of segmented, downward assimilation as a response to limited opportunities, discrimination or outright hostility (Haller & Landolt 2005, Portes 2007), this still implies that social ties with origin communities will weaken over the longer term. Moreover, as a consequence of the limited human and financial resources, such communities will also have *less capabilities* to provide assistance to new migrants. Also here, it is important to keep in mind Bourdieu’s important but oft-ignored distinction between the networks themselves and the resources that can be claimed through such social capital.

6.5. Sending-end migration undermining dynamics

The internal social, cultural and economic processes that may contribute to network breakdown at the *sending* end have hardly received any attention, but are no less important. According to migration diffusion theory, we can expect migration rates to slow down once the majority of families or households within a particular social or ethnic group participate in migration to a particular destination. In fact, there are also striking parallels between the U-shape relationship between network growth and migration rates and the bell curve-like evolution of migration rates typical for migration diffusion theory (see figure 3). It is therefore likely that these two processes are mutually reinforcing and will result in decreasing migration rates over time.

In addition, such diffusion and the decreasing selectivity of migration over time is likely to eventually dampen or even reverse the initial inequality and relative deprivation increasing effect of migration and, particularly, remittances. Finally, diffusion of the international migration experience throughout communities is likely to result in a declining prestige attached to international labour migration, which become a “normal” phenomenon. This may even lead to increasingly negative values attached to migration, as a last resort for “laggards”, or people who cannot make it at home⁷. Such processes will also lead to attenuate relative deprivations and, hence, migration aspirations and propensities at the sending side. How steep this decline in migration propensities will really be, is obviously contingent on exogenous economic and political factors determining local opportunities.

Besides declining diffusion rates and contextual dynamics potentially leading to less migration, there are other, more endogenous dynamics causing network decline at the sending end. These are triggered by the wish among resident, remittance-receiving migrant families to avoid negative social capital. If international migrants and the family they left behind are continuously confronted with excessive claims by more distant family and community members for financial and/or migration assistance, this can eventually cause a social and also spatial distancing from non-migrant community members. In rural areas of Morocco for instance, migration-related tensions on remittance use between women left behind and their families-in-law have played an accelerating role in the breakdown of extended families and the concomitant nucleation of family life (de Haas 2003, De Mas 1990, Hajjarabi 1995).

Besides investment, social security, wellbeing and status motives, this creates an additional push for migrants’ nuclear families to construct new houses either in the native village or in nearby towns. Besides increasing the personal liberty of the spouses of migrants, this can also be an effective strategy for migrants to escape from the heavy financial burden of supporting large extended families and helping other community members. Second or third houses are often not constructed in the native village, but in towns, often preceding *internal migration* of entire households. Such spatial lifting out of nuclear families has been observed in several Moroccan migrant-sending areas, and can be interpreted as an attempt to escape from social pressures to

⁷ I observed this during fieldwork I conducted in a rural area in Turkey, where rural youth aimed to study and build their futures in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Labour migration to Europe was increasingly seen as behaviour typical for “losers”. There seems to be an obvious link between this shift in orientations and Turkey’s recent spectacular economic growth.

“help” excessive claims by community members, the second form of negative social capital identified by Portes (1998).

Several studies have shown that attitudes of nonmigrants vis-à-vis relatively wealthy international migrants and their families are rather ambivalent. Migrants and their household members are both praised and vilified. People’s jealousy of migrants tends to be expressed through by strong moral-religious criticism. “Good” migrants are expected to share their wealth with poorer villagers and to help them with establishing businesses, obtaining visas or irregular migration. Migrants are considered as “selfish” or “bad Muslims” if they do not behave according to these norms. This puts enormous moral pressure on migrants, in particular during holiday visits.

Those not acting conform to traditional norms of “shared poverty” (cf. Geertz 1963) behaviour entails the risk of being criticized. This way of putting social pressure on migrants to share their wealth with family and community members is another example of the “downside of social capital” – and can eventually encourage the relocation of migrant households and the breakdown of networks. Although these processes are obviously an intrinsic part of more general social and cultural processes of family nucleation and individualisation, but have been accelerated by the migration-related tensions between migrant families and community members. It is evident that these processes contribute to the breakdown of migrant networks and increasing selectivity of migration, which generally becomes more and more limited to first degree family members.

Portes (1998: 16) argued that “cozy intergroup relations of the kind found in highly solidary communities can give rise to a gigantic free-riding problem, as less diligent members enforce on the more successful all kinds of demands backed by a shared normative structure”. This should also be a warning against all-too-romantic and naïve interpretations of “community solidarity”, which can be of great value to those in need but also asphyxiating to the aspiring and successful.

6. Conclusion

Past research has identified the role of networks in explaining why migration processes become self-perpetuating leading to the establishment of migration systems. However, by focusing on the role of migrant networks in endogenously perpetuating migration processes, current theories have largely obscured other internal. This particularly applies for the feedback mechanisms operating through migration affected changes in the sending and receiving contexts. Second, current theories are remarkably unable to explain why these network effects do not always occur and are actually fairly exceptional. This is testified by the much-ignored fact that many initial migration moves do not unleash processes of chain migration. Third, the central argument of conventional network theories is *circular*, according to which migration goes on *ad infinitum*, assuming a naïve linearity of causality between the growth of migrant communities and (positive) network externalities.

Current theories give surprisingly little systematic insight in the internal mechanisms that counteract the tendencies that lead to increasing migration through networks and which may lead to the weakening of migrant systems over time. This paper has provided theoretical and empirical evidence in order to outline the contours of a theoretical framework on internal migration dynamics. It has done so by systematically distinguishing endogenous (network) and contextual (sending and receiving communities) dynamics.

As a starting point, the paper conceptualised migration as (1) integral part of broader socio-economic transformation processes, which (2) also has its internal, self-sustaining *and self-undermining* endogenous dynamics, which (3) affects such processes of change in its own right, in particular at the local and regional level. In their turn, these migration-affected contextual changes affect subsequent migration patterns. Where (2) refers to direct (endogenous) internal dynamics, (4) refers to indirect (contextual) internal dynamics of migration processes. Taking a longitudinal perspective of migration as a diffusion process, the paper has attempted to achieve an improved understanding of the fundamentally heterogeneous nature of migration diffusion processes across different social, cultural and economic settings.

The core of the argument was that internal dynamics operate in a fundamentally non-linear way and that their role and effect on subsequent migration therefore tends to change in the different stages of migration processes and as networks grow in size. To summarise, these internal dynamics tends to be positive and self-reinforcing at early stages of the growth of migrant communities, but tend to decrease over time and eventually become self-undermining. While positive network externalities derived at the destination from the clustering of migrants are likely to increase fast during early build-up phases of migrant communities but will decrease and can become negative at later stages through diseconomies of scale and increased competition for jobs and the resources. In the same vein, the initially inequality, relative deprivation and income increasing contextual effects of financial and social remittances on sending communities tend to *increase* people's capabilities and aspirations to migrate. At later stages of migration diffusion processes, such effects *tend* to be dampened or even

reversed, if migration selectivity and, hence, remittance-propelled inequality decreases and the social prestige attached to migration declines.

We can draw the following analytical conclusions from this paper. First, the evidence presented in this paper contradicts common views of which primarily see migration as the result of marginalisation and, subsequently, impoverishment, and conceptualize contextual internal dynamics at the sending end as “cumulative causation”; A negative vicious cycle of migration-more impoverishment-more migration, and so on. This paper argued that the circularity of this argument is highly problematic and the analysis highlighted its logical inconsistencies.

Second, there is a need to improve theories on the processes that precede the moment that migrant communities reach the critical threshold value at which migration processes tend to become self-reinforcing. Although there is a significant research gap here, the paper has scrutinized the different processes that might be at play during the early phases of migration processes that eventually may or may not lead to the evolution of full-blown migration systems. By casting pioneer migration as innovative behaviour by non-conformist community members escaping *negative* social capital such as the oppressive lack of personal freedoms. In order to explain why only some initial migratory moves by pioneer migrants result in large-scale group migration through networks, the analysis has drawn on Epstein’s distinction between “herd” and network effects to explain the fact that migrants tend to quickly gravitate around a few number of destinations.

Third, there seems to be a need to counterbalance one-sided positive views on the role social capital in facilitating migration through networks. The paper showed that concepts derived from the critical social capital literature as pioneered by Portes (1998) and his colleagues can be successfully applied to develop a more nuanced of the positive *and* negative role of social capital in migration processes. Closed networks may facilitate migration of group members, but also tend exclusionary for outsiders and may therefore effectively *impede* the diffusion of migration within and across communities.

Finally, with the growth of migrant communities and the passing of time, positive externalities of network formation and economics of scale of the growth of immigrant clusters tend to decline and may finally become negative. This explains why settled migrants and their descendants often become from “bridgeheads” to “gatekeepers”. In addition, negative social capital in the form of excessive claims by nonmigrant community members and strong moral pressure to support them, seems to play an important role in the crumbling of migration systems. This again highlights the need for a more critical discussion of the fundamentally mixed blessings of social capital in migration processes.

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