The role of the state in international migration

Exploring the transition from colony to independence

Simona Vezzoli

DEMIG project paper 26

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Abstract

This paper presents a conceptual framework to examine how the state shapes international migration in origin and destination countries, particularly in former colonies transitioning to independence or non-sovereignty. This paper proposes an expanded view of the state’s relevance in migration and introduces a conceptualisation of a country’s transition from colonial status to independence or non-sovereignty. This is done by presenting four hypothetical scenarios of the different ways in which migration patterns shift in reaction to the introduction and timing of independence and border regimes.

Keywords: Migration policies, non-migration policies, migration determinants, emigration, independence, non-sovereignty

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1 Introduction

Empirical research suggests that countries that became independent during the 20th century share some similarities in migration patterns, particularly a migration propensity toward the former colonial state (Fassmann and Munz 1992; Hooghe et al. 2008; Massey et al. 1998). However, important variations of migration dynamics exist across former colonies: while some countries display strong emigration to the former colonial state, others show an important diversification of destinations. These variations prompt us to reconsider our understanding of post-colonial migration. For example, the notion of post-colonial ties, frequently used in quantitative analyses to account for factors that attract migrants to the former colonial state, has been weakly conceptualised; thus, we are currently unable to identify the relevance of individual factors, such as language, culture, educational systems or privileged relations, and to recognise the circumstances under which post-colonial ties may, or may not, influence international migration. This paper addresses existing research gaps in migration research by asking two questions: What is the role of the state in shaping migration patterns in former colonies? And what are the short-to mid-term effects of the transition from colonial status to independence on international migration?

Considerations of the role of the state in migration can be clustered in two main arguments: some scholars who argue that the state has largely lost its ability to control migration (Bhagwati 2003; Castles 2004); and others who suggest that while globalisation and the protection of human rights constrain the states’ ability to impose highly restrictive policies, it remains critically important and will continue to ‘attempt to regulate, control, and channel migrants’ (Strikwerda 1999:394). Both sides of this debate largely confine the role of states to their immigration and emigration policies. A few scholars have argued that the role of the state goes beyond migration policies (de Haas 2010; Massey 1999). For instance, the welfare system has been the focus of research to examine whether it acts as potential ‘magnet’ attracting migrants to destination countries (Borjas 1999; De Giorgi and Pellizzari 2009); concurrently, the welfare system in origin countries may also act as a ‘magnet’, retaining potential emigrants in the origin countries (Kureková 2011; Mahendra 2014 forthcoming). Such research demonstrates that states in both origin and destinations countries affect migration through a broad realm of policies – eg minimum wage and working hour regulations, education policies, social protection policies or transportation policies. A broad policy approach offers a useful perspective to study the state’s far-reaching effects on migration. Such an approach can also help us to examine the decolonisation process, when a range of policy reforms are introduced in newly independent countries.

Processes of decolonisation account for the transition from a colonial to a post-colonial political status, which includes independence or the transition to a non-sovereign status with continued dependence from the former colonial state but a greater degree of autonomy.¹ At the core of the transition to independence is the establishment of physical borders and a border regime to regulate migration into the former colonial state. Although this suggests greater barriers to migration, some research shows that independent countries paradoxically display higher emigration than non-sovereign countries (McElroy and Sanborn 2005),² which raises questions about the role of borders and border regulations in preventing or, alternatively, encouraging emigration. Certainly, independence and border regimes may affect migration in interaction with other migration-relevant factors that occur in the

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¹ It could be argued that colonies that have become incorporated or received autonomy have not experienced decolonisation because they retain some characteristics typical of colonies. However, non-sovereign countries have various forms of self-government and often receive economic contributions by the former colonial state (Aldrich and Connell 1998:3), making them distinct from former colonies.

² I find the term country to be appropriate given the distinct political and national identities which typically characterise these territories in spite of political unity, eg the Basque country.
independence transition, such as peaceful or conflictual conditions, intense policy reforms, identity formation and geopolitical positioning in relation to the former colonial state and alternative international partners. These processes are fraught with uncertainty and long-term processes of adjustment, which are highly likely to influence migration decisions.

This paper contributes to our understanding of the role of the state in shaping post-colonial migration patterns beyond its migration policies. The following conceptual elaborations apply globally, although this paper relies principally on examples from the Caribbean region, the area of focus of my research. After a brief review of how the state has been conceptualised in migration studies, I propose a categorisation of state policies to illustrate how both migration and non-migration policies may lead to potential direct and indirect migration effects. The paper then conceptualises the transition to independence or to non-sovereign status and its potential effects on migration and presents hypothetical scenarios that systematically analyse how independence, border regimes, post-colonial ties and other structural changes may affect migration volumes, composition, timing and direction. These scenarios provide innovative insights on the role of the state in origin countries at times of high levels of structural political and policy transformations.

2 Migration and the expanded role of the state

2.1 The state in migration theories

Since Ravenstein (1885) laid down his laws of migration in 1885, a number of migration theories have evolved to explain causal mechanisms in migration processes and identify potential migration determinants (cf. Massey et al. 1993). Most migration theories have, however, provided little explicit elaboration on the role of the state in migration processes focusing much more on economic drivers both at the individual level and as part of broad macro-economic processes of globalisation. Moreover, when the role of the state is considered, migration scholars tend to reduce it to migration policies (Massey 1999; Strikwerda 1999), and ultimately to immigration policies.

The equalisation of the state to immigration policies may be related to fluctuating public concerns and political interests to find policy solutions to control immigration volumes. As a result, much migration research focuses on the analysis of immigration policies and their effectiveness in managing migration volumes, rather than analysing how states broadly affect migration patterns, in terms of its timing, destinations and composition of flows. Given such focus on immigration policies, origin countries have lost relevance and these states are generally perceived as unable to prevent emigration without infringing upon basic human rights (Zolberg 2007), particularly after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its highly restrictive emigration regimes (de Haas and Vezzoli 2011; Dowty 1987; Matthews 1993).

When we take a closer look, however, we notice that some migration theories conceive the state more broadly than its immigration policies alone. Neoclassical economics theory identifies the state’s relevance in migration in two specific areas: labour policies and migration policies (Massey et al. 1993). In this theory, governments in origin and destination countries may alter migration by regulating labour markets, making employment of non-native workers more difficult, increasing wages in countries of origin so as to lower the benefits of emigration or by increasing the costs of migration, e.g. introducing greater barriers to entry (Harris and Todaro 1970; Lee 1966; Massey et al. 1993; Todaro and Maruszko 1987).

In the new economics of labour migration (NELM) theory, the state plays an important role through insurance markets. In this theoretical framework, states may significantly shape migration by
promoting reliable insurance markets and capital markets, which give people greater security and allow them to pursue investments in the origin community. Moreover, national governments may introduce policies to alter income distribution, e.g., reducing inequality, and influence feelings of relative deprivation (Massey et al. 1993; Stark and Bloom 1985). Rather than reducing migration, however, shifts in income distribution and inequality levels may in fact change the composition of migration (Stark and Yitzhaki 1988).

World systems theory frames states as entangled in the global economy via multinational corporations for which they may intervene politically or militarily to protect peripheral markets and raw resources. In this perspective, international migration has little to do with wage rates or employment differentials between countries, but with the global economic structure, trade, investment, flows of goods and capital and much of the power has been removed from the state and is now held by multinational corporations. However, states may attempt to influence migration by creating immigration policies that aim to contain some of the unintended migration flows created by these macro-level processes, including rural-urban migrations and refugees. While these policies may not be effective, they allow states to retain symbolic control in an attempt to retain legitimacy (Massey 1999).

Nevertheless, the importance given to the state in migration remains limited. Yet, the role of the state is central to development. Its ability to create institutions and infrastructure and to provide opportunities for individuals (Skeldon 1997), mainly through a broad range of policies, suggests that the state influences migration in multiple ways. There is thus a need to relate emerging empirical evidence on specific state-driven migration determinants, such as the impact of practices to obtain passports (McKenzie 2005) or of land reform policies (Fitzgerald 2006), to new reflections of the role of the state in migration and to acknowledge that a wide range of commonly used migration determinants (e.g., economic structure, inequality, social welfare) are significantly affected by the state.

2.2 The state beyond migration policies

If states and their policies matter, what are the policies that matter and how do they matter? Are the policies identified in migration theories to date the limit of state relevance in migration? To explore these questions, I propose a classification of state policies that applies to states in origin and destination countries and captures both migration and non-migration policies. Immigration policies have been defined as ‘rules (i.e., laws, regulations and measures) that national states define and implement with the (often only implicitly stated) objective of affecting the volume, origin, direction, and internal composition of immigration flows’ (Czaika and de Haas 2013: 489). Similarly, emigration policies aim to affect emigration flows. In this paper, migration policies refer to both immigration and emigration policies.

Non-migration policies are regulations that states define and enact to affect a wide range of societal aspects that do not strictly relate to migration, migrants or potential migrants. Yet many of these policies may, intentionally or unintentionally, alter the socio-economic conditions in the country and indirectly stimulate or discourage migration, either of citizens (leaving or returning) or foreign citizens (entering or returning). Among these policies are those that regulate a broad range of areas such as education, welfare protection, labour conditions or military and defence.

In the definition of migration policies provided above, migration policies are set apart from all other policies because of their migration objectives. In practice, however, the separation between migration and non-migration policies is less clear (Czaika and de Haas 2013). States may attempt to influence migration using measures that are not associated with migration – e.g. in social welfare or education – while in other instance they may use policy tools generally associated with migration – e.g
travel visa, work or residence permits to promote non-migration objectives such as attracting investment or stimulating innovation. Figure 1 proposes a classification of four groups of policies according to their policy type, policy objective and policy tool.

This classification knowingly reduces the role of states in migration to policies, although in reality, the socio-legal environment in which policies are introduced (i.e., legal culture, institutional culture, bureaucracy, policing practices) may be imperceptible but real ways in which states also influence migration. Perhaps even more intangible, but of no trivial importance, is the role of the state in promoting national identity and policies of inclusion/exclusion, which may be of particular importance at time of nation-building (Douki 2007) and in cases when countries separate from a larger entity, as in the case of independence (Janssen 2011). Although we must be aware of the subtle effects of state action on migration beyond policies, we can try to advance new perspectives on how the state may affect migration through migration and non-migration policies.

**Figure 1. The state and its migration and non-migration policies**

On the far left of Figure 1, policies in group 1 share a stated objective to influence migration patterns and use tools commonly recognized as migration policy measures such as the point system, labour recruitment and family reunification in destination countries and exit visas and rights protection in origin countries. Group 2 consists of policies that are regularly considered migration policies because they use a migration tool, although they challenge the migration policy definition by not having an outright migration objective. Business and entrepreneurial visa categories are meant to stimulate investment, employment and innovation much more than promoting migration per se (Sumption 2012; Sumption and Hooper 2014). Although the characteristics of the migrants (e.g., education, skills) may be important, it is their economic contribution and ability to stimulate entrepreneurship and create jobs that is significant. By 2012, the severe conditions of the 2008 economic crisis led Portugal and Ireland to provide residence permits to foreigners who would buy a home between 400,000 and 500,000 euros, while Hungary offered residence permits to non-European nationals who would purchase a special issue

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A policy tool represents the measure identified by the policy to regulate migration; de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli (2014) identify 28 policy tools.
bond valued at least 250,000 euros. The issuance of residence permits is a ‘reward’ for those individuals who, regardless of nationality, are willing to boost the financial and housing market.

Alternatively, states may also try to affect migration by using policy tools that are not conventionally associated with migration (Group 3, Figure 1). Educational reform may be introduced to reduce emigration, prepare citizens for emigration or to attract international students and subsequently high-skilled workers. In the 1970s, the government of Trinidad and Tobago, concerned with the brain drain of qualified workers and students attending university in Europe and North America, introduced reforms and scholarships to increase opportunities in secondary and tertiary education within the Caribbean and promoted national employment opportunities (Central Statistical Office 1970). Notwithstanding their migration objective, such policies are not generally regarded as migration policies because they rely on non-migration tools; thus, they are not included in analyses of migration policies effects.

Group 4 includes policies that are not considered relevant for migration and contains the vast majority of state-promoted policies that do not have any association with migration. These policies (e.g. labour market structure, land reforms, social security, transport, communications) may trigger changes in living conditions, alter the set of opportunities and challenges faced by specific groups of individuals and affect emigration and immigration without intending to do so. The reduction of government subsidies for elderly care may increase immigration of migrant workers, able to provide equal services at lower costs. Recognising the migration-relevance of this group of policies is particularly important for origin countries, where the state faces legal constraints to affect migration beyond the few emigration policies that we recognise, i.e. those that promote emigration (Asis 2008; Douki 2007) and protect migrant workers in countries where they are subjected to abuse (Hugo and Stahl 2004).

Table 1 Examples of migration and non-migration policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy group</th>
<th>Group 1</th>
<th>Group 2</th>
<th>Group 3</th>
<th>Group 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direction of flow affected</td>
<td>Migration policy, migration objective &amp; migration tool</td>
<td>Migration policy, non-migration objective, migration tool</td>
<td>Non-migration policy (NM), migration objective, NM tool</td>
<td>Non-migration policy, non-migration, NM objective &amp; NM tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Work permits for workers; residence permits; regularisation</td>
<td>Permits for entrepreneurs; “Citizenship-by-investment”</td>
<td>Reduction of welfare benefits to immigrant population</td>
<td>Austerity measures that cut social care subsidies; policy that stimulates construction of social housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>Pre-selection of workers for recruitment abroad; exit permits</td>
<td>Migration &amp; development policies (migration objective may also be present)</td>
<td>Benefits for doctors who stay, increasing educational opportunities to reduce emigration for study purposes</td>
<td>Privatisation of government services; land reform; changes in political status (e.g. independence)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most current migration research is largely concentrated on policies included in groups 1 and 2, and within these groups the attention is given primarily to immigration policies (Table 1). This categorisation also brings to light that although we usually consider policies in Group 2 as migration policies, they do not fully fit our conventional definition of migration policies given the mixed character

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4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9689008/Foreigners-offered-chance-to-stay-in-Spain-for-130000.html#

5 See Sumption and Hooper 2014.
of their policy objectives. Conversely, policies in Group 3 fit our conventional definition of migration policies, but because they are implemented in non-migration policies areas (ie education) and utilise non-migration policy tools (ie scholarships) they are often difficult to identify and escape most well-intended migration policy analyses. This categorisation does not do enough justice to the wide array of policies in Group 4 which may be relevant for migration but are often ignored and is meant to encourage us to explore how such non-migration policies may shape migration. It also provides a workable framework to explore how the state shapes migration through a set of migration and non-migration policies during the process of political status change.

3 Changes in political status and migration

3.1 Colonialism, independence, non-sovereignty and migration

Historical-structural migration theories view colonialism as one of the mechanisms that brought peripheral areas and populations into the global economy and promoted migration among certain colonies, as well as between the colonies and European countries (Massey et al. 1993). In the Caribbean region, societies are the product of large-scale state-endorsed labour movements across continents undertaken to fill labour shortages in the plantation system, first through slavery and later through indentured labour (Segal 1998). Unlike African rural-urban migrations described by Mabogunje (1970), in the Caribbean even rural populations where greatly connected to European economies through the plantation system and acculturation was emphasised through education and the creation of a national elite and classes of administrators. Colonial incorporation was so successful that Zelinsky (1971) argued that colonial migrations were nothing other than an extension of domestic migrations, made possible by solid institutional and ideological connections which, in turn, reduced physical barriers (eg oceans) between colonies and the colonial state.

Zelinsky (1971) did not provide any elaboration of what may happen to these ‘domestic migrations’ at the moment of political separation, but world systems theory has argued that in spite of the end of colonialism and the acquisition of rights to sovereignty, newly independent states have continued to exist as dependent entities, generally inserted at the bottom of global political and economic hierarchies (Massey et al. 1998; McIlwaine 2008). This would suggest a continuation of various forms of earlier ‘domestic migrations’. In fact, many scholars argue that current migration patterns may be seen as continuations of historical processes that have expanded within and beyond this region. Asymmetrical power, accumulation and concentration of capital and labour market demands in developed countries combined with weak economic development and labour market surpluses in developing countries have led to continued dependency and also to significant emigration of high and low-skilled migrants since the 1950s (Levine 1987; Samers 1997; Segal 1998; Thomas-Hope 1980).

This continuation of ‘domestic migration’ is also expected for those former colonies that have been legally integrated into the former colonial state as non-sovereign countries. The migration impact of political integration is far from clear however. First, a variety of non-sovereign statuses exist with different levels of autonomy over territorial matters, with full incorporation the furthest from independence. So while the French Overseas Departments (DOMs) are an integral part of France and Hawaii of the USA; the British Virgin Islands are a British Overseas Territory with some autonomy but under the authority of a Governor appointed by the Queen. The level of incorporation is largely associated with the freedom of movement to the former colonial state enjoyed by the inhabitants of these countries.

Research on independent and non-sovereign countries is limited and touches on a few case studies such as the Federated States of Micronesia, which since 1986 enjoy the right to free migration
to the USA (Grieco 2003; Hezel and McGrath 1989), and migration effects of Puerto Rico’s possible statehood or independence from the USA (Santiago unknown). McElroy and Sanborn (2005) investigated migration in small sovereign and non-sovereign Caribbean islands and concluded that sovereign states experience higher emigration due to their lower economic growth, while non-sovereign countries are more prosperous and have become immigrant-receiving countries. However, Guadeloupe and Martinique, both French DOMs, and the Netherland Antilles and the US Virgin Islands, show net emigration.

Grosfoguel (1996) also compared migration from non-sovereign and independent countries and concluded that, in absence of a border regime, non-sovereign countries experience higher emigration, particularly of rural and less educated migrants, as observed for Puerto Rico and Martinique. Audebert (2007) also used the case studies of Puerto Rico and the French Antilles and added Haiti to examine how non-sovereignty helps to maintain a political and legal framework that facilitates migration. Milia (1997) showed, however, how free mobility alone may not explain greater migrations from non-sovereign states as today’s large emigration from the French DOMs find their roots in the French government’s 1960s decision to recruit emigrants through a national bureau, the BUMIDOM (cf. Condon and Ogden 1991; Constant 1987).

3.2 Post-colonial ties as a migration determinant

Migration literature commonly utilises the notion of ‘post-colonial ties’ or ‘post-colonial links’ to refer to the post-independence connections between former colonial states and their former colonies, which allegedly lead to greater migration propensities towards former colonial states. Very little conceptualisation has occurred since the early 1990s, when Fassmann and Munz (1992) identified that migration was affected by ‘cultural and political affinities rooted in history’, including a common language and the fact that former colonies’ ‘economy, transportation systems, and culture are still oriented toward London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Lisbon’ (Fassmann and Munz 1992). Current research refers to post-colonial ties as: enduring linguistic, ideological, intellectual and cultural ties; administrative and educational systems; military presence, direct transport links and communication; and the presence of migrant networks (Beine, Docquier and Özden 2009; Belot and Hatton 2010; Constant and Tien 2009; Hooghe et al. 2008; Thielemann 2006). While these connections are undeniable, no conceptual endeavour has evolved to explain how these factors affect migration and why we observe important variations in migration patterns between former colonies and former colonial states.

The limited explanatory power of this catch-all notion can be observed in quantitative studies that operationalise postcolonial ties as a dummy variable to test whether countries with a colonial past show common migration patterns. While such studies find an overall positive effect of post-colonial ties, not surprisingly, when they look at the migration effects of specific former colonial states the findings are ambiguous. Hooghe et al. (2008) analysed total migration flows to 21 European countries and showed a positive and long-term stable effect of colonial past; however, their analysis of bilateral flows indicated that over time Spain, Portugal, Italy and France have become more attractive to former colonial migrants while the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium seem to have become less attractive. The

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6 By using the hyphenated term ‘post-colonial’, I refer to the historical period after colonialism and the direct consequences of decolonisation and shifts in bilateral relations between the former colony and the former colonial state. I do not adopt the notion of ‘postcolonialism’, the unhyphenated term, which refers to the dominance of western culture and to the argument that the nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America are in a position of subordination and economic inequality in relation to Europe and North America (Young 2003). Postcolonialism is used in migration research to acknowledge that colonial legacies and hegemonic powers continue to dominate and influence migration (McIwaine 2008).
authors suggest that such differences may be explained by language effects, favourable policies or exclusive transportation links, ie flights connecting the former colony only to the former colonial state. Constant and Tien (2009) also showed a positive effect of former colonial links, but their results partially differed from the previous study as Portugal exerts stronger attraction than Belgium, Germany and Italy, while historical links are not significant for individuals from former British, French and Spanish colonies.

Post-colonial ties have also been considered in relation to high-skilled migration from former colonies, based on the notion that these individuals enjoy ‘educational proximity’ and greater transferability of skills, which facilitate their migration to Western countries (Belot and Hatton 2010). Beine, Docquier and Schiff (2008) found that although post-colonial ties matter, they don’t apply equally to all individuals. Finally, Neumayer (2006) suggested that post-colonial ties are significant in determining visa restrictions only if colonial links are combined with current membership in the Commonwealth. This suggests that post-colonial ties may weaken over time, but that they may also be renewed through new forms of membership.

Current empirical evidence fails to explain why we see enduring post-colonial ties in some cases and not in others. Answers may be found once we distinguish among former colonial states, their relations to specific types of colonies (eg plantation economics, trade posts, strategic territorial possessions, etc), specific processes of decolonisation and years from independence. In other words, it may be necessary to account for the process of decolonisation and for what factors may be important among all those included in the broad definition of ‘post-colonial ties’.

3.3 Deepening our understanding of political status change and post-colonial ties

Considerations of colonial and post-colonial effects on migration have failed to conceptualise the process of these political transitions: how the state shapes its migration and non-migration policies, how these may alter people’s expectations and opportunities, and how policy transformation and peoples’ responses may lead to shifts in migration patterns. To explain migration variations, four areas deserve further exploration: (i) the heterogeneous experiences of colonialism and the process of decolonisation; (ii) the establishment of border regimes; (iii) the passage of time and political and socio-economic transformations and the evolution of relations between former colonial state and former colonies; and (iv) the agency of individuals in former colonial societies.

3.3.1 Colonisation styles and decolonisation processes

Colonialism had a profound and long-lasting impact on vast areas of the world. Colonial powers had specific interests and strategies to administer their colonies and precise perspectives on the role of their overseas populations (Byron and Condon 2008; Heffernan 1995; Lucassen 1995). Only certain segments of the colonial population within a colony were brought into the European sphere, typically the elite and urban professionals, but specific economic interests may have led to the migration of migrant labourers and rural agricultural workers. In Africa, colonial administrators gradually brought rural areas into the national economy and rural-urban migration systems emerged (Mabogunje 1970). Samers (1997) described how the French state deliberately concentrated its recruitment of Algerian workers for the automobile industry in the Kabylie region, where households had traditionally relied on regional migration. As men became fully incorporated into the migration systems with France, migration from this region became central to the livelihood of the population beyond colonial times. In the Caribbean, however, societies were deeply rooted in international migration, making migration a frequently used strategy for social mobility even among rural populations already in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Insanally, Clifford and Sheriff 2006). Such different embodiments of colonialism
would have led to very different perceptions of migration and different degrees of people’s readiness to migrate. These important differences may explain why findings are inconclusive when we compare migration from former French colonies and former British colonies or from former Caribbean colonies and former African colonies.

Similarly, the process of decolonisation should not be seen as homogeneous. The degree and speed of transformation may be associated to whether independence is obtained peacefully or through conflict. Consequently, independence may be perceived as a time of heightened uncertainty or of promise and change, stimulating more or less emigration, respectively. Moreover, even with a positive outlook, former colonies would transition from a ‘developed’ to a ‘developing country’ in terms of access to resources and human capital. Independence may introduce uncertainties in terms of the institutions upon which individuals have come to rely (e.g., banking system, unemployment insurance, free education), encouraging the migration for individuals unable to reduce future risks. This would, however, be contingent upon the population’s expectations and trustworthiness of the government in power. Beyond economic factors, individuals may have concerns about representation, legitimacy of expected future governments and security and protection of private interests. Expectations may also be influenced by developments in other newly independent countries; e.g., pre-independent Suriname’s close watch on the developments in neighbouring independent Guyana. Ultimately, these socio-economic and political transformations and the policies put in place from the first day after independence may make the population consider emigration as a risk-spreading solution.

The former colonial state’s previous decolonisation experiences and national interests would have also determined their approach towards independence. Byron and Condon (2008) showed the different objectives of the French and British states, particularly in relation to whether and how to retain connections to the colonies and their populations after decolonisation. The style and processes of colonisation and decolonisation may provide key insights of how migration evolved at independence or with non-sovereignty.

3.3.2 The establishment of border regimes

While a variety of policies may shape migration during decolonisation, independence means the establishment of a border regime. A border regime is a set of policies that regulate the movement across the border through border patrols and checkpoints, visa systems, but also new citizenship laws, which officially remove the freedom of movement previously granted to ‘colonial subjects’. Since 1945 almost one hundred states have gained independence and established a regulatory system at their borders (Christopher 2002). The establishment of borders, dividing previously continuous political units and limiting previously free movement, may not be as clear-cut as it seems. In fact, there is a distinction between a border regime and a physical border. The establishment of a physical border, namely the location where some of the migration policies are implemented, does not necessarily imply the establishment of a border regime, as much as the introduction of a border regime can occur without the official introduction of a border (Langer 1999). The establishment of a physical border and a border regime may occur at different times, with the border regime preceding the physical border or vice versa.

The establishment of physical borders and a border regime through independence affects migration and may produce unintended ‘migration substitution effects’ on the volume, timing, spatial

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1 I thank Edo Mahendra for directing my attention to the fact that the former colonies and the former colonisers may have acted according to different frames of reference. For example, in the process of Suriname’s independence, the scars of Indonesian independence affected the Dutch government’s desire to reach a ‘model independence’, while for the Surinamese the frame of reference remained the contentious situation in neighbouring post-independence Guyana. This led to significantly different perspectives on the benefits and risks of independence and the role of migration.
orientation or composition of migration flows. De Haas (2011) defined migration substitution effects as the unintended and unexpected effects produced by migration policies and identified four effects: (2) spatial substitution when restrictive policies divert migration to alternative destinations; (2) categorical substitution when migration is shifted to alternative regular or irregular migration channels; (3) inter-temporal substitution when migration is anticipated in light of potential tightening of migration policies, often referred to as ‘now or never’ or ‘beat the ban’ migration; and (4) reverse flow substitution when restrictive immigration policies impact decisions to return. Independence and border regime establishment provide an opportunity to systematically examine whether and how migration substitution effects take place and shape specific timing, volumes, characteristics and destination of migration (see Section 4).

3.3.3 The passage of time and the evolution of post-colonial relations

Although the historical-structural processes suggested by world systems theory may be perceived as timeless, the passage of time may weaken the migration effects of even strong historical connections. Head, Mayer and Ries (2010) analysed the relation between independence and trade and suggested that independence between former colonies and former colonial states introduced not so much a sudden rupture, but a slow ‘erosion’ of a preferential position of the former colonial state. This is attributed to a weakening of the human capital and business networks over the 30 to 40 years since independence (Head, Mayer and Ries 2010). While we could hypothesise that the same ‘erosion’ may occur for migration, we cannot ignore some important differences, principally that flows of migrants rely on family and community connections which may be renewed and deepened with each additional migrant, possibly making the preference for the former colonial state as a migration destination more resilient to time than trade.

Time may, however, lead to changes of preference. For instance, a former colony’s decision to strengthen diplomatic and commercial relations with a state other than the former colonial state may impact migration opportunities, or an educational reform to adopt a more nationalistic curriculum (eg change of language, history or geography curricula) may diminish the cultural and language affinities and preferential status of the former colonial state. Overall, the various processes of transformation that took place in former colonies cannot be ignored if we truly want to understand the evolution of migration in post-colonial settings.

3.3.4 The agency of migrants in a structured post-colonial environment

A striking shortfall in the notion of post-colonial ties is the removal of agency from individuals in former colonies, who are seen as pawns in an endlessly subjugated, powerless and dependent position, reflecting more generally the way in which states in developing counties have been represented as ‘relatively passive and ineffective’ in relation to developed countries (Skeldon 1997: 26). Reacting to the forces of colonial history, these individuals are denied a sense of self-identity, individual preference, and the ability to introduce change in these structural conditions. This Eurocentric view denies the numerous forms of resistance to the destructive aspects of colonial history, the imposition of hegemonic values (Young 2003), and the negative migration experiences in the former colonial state, including the rejection of former colonial populations on the basis of racial differences despite equal citizenship (Fanon 1952). Thus, we may say that while there is an attraction to migrate to the former colonial state, forms of rejections may co-exist.

Newly independent states and their populations have also gradually developed a sense of national identity. In a study on identity in Réunion, a French DOM, Médéa (2010) found that in Mauritius independence signalled the search for a new post-colonial identity that departed from the
colonial period, while in Réunion a neo-colonial identity emerged as the French state tried to superimpose French values and norms over a Réunion identity. The new identity of Mauritius and the tensions between a French and a Réunionese identity are likely to influence the strength of post-colonial ties and their power to determine migration destination. Similar processes have certainly taken place in other post-colonial contexts.

Individual agency may influence the timing, direction, composition and rationale of migration. Hence, when the former colonial state is selected as a destination it may be because of its intrinsic values (associative preference) which make migrants admire and associate the former colonial state with success. For other individuals however, the former colonial state may be a stepping stone, a place of opportunity that could easily be exchanged for any other place with equal or similar opportunities (instrumental preference). Clearly, these two types of preferences, and their underlying drivers, may explain why post-colonial ties operate strongly in some contexts and are ineffective in other instances.

4 Conceptualising the migration effects of political status changes, border regimes and post-colonial ties

The following four hypothetical scenarios help to unravel how independence and non-sovereignty may affect migration patterns in terms of timing, volume, direction and characteristics of migration. These scenarios aim to bring together the explanatory power of states, which determine the timing and conditions of political status and border regime changes, the various processes of decolonisation, the time dimension and individual responses described in the previous sections.

Core to these scenarios is the understanding that the transition to independence creates a number of uncertainties, which may vary depending on a number of factors including whether independence was achieved peacefully or through conflict, whether the new state follows the development trajectories set by the former colonial state or carves out its own identity (eg education reform) and novel structures away from its historical roots. These changes would alter the set of opportunities and challenges faced by the population. Independence may be experienced as a moment of great opportunities, particularly for groups of citizens close to the power structure, or as a moment of great anxiety generated by the transfer of power from a familiar colonial government to a newly independent government without a previous ruling history. The establishment of a border regime also contributes to feelings of uncertainty and anxiety, but its effects on migration may depend on its timing and the set of policies introduced.

The proposed scenarios also visualise how political status and border regime transformations may lead to specific migration substitution effects (de Haas 2011) and present four variations: (i) synchronous independence and border regime; (ii) border regime enacted before independence; (iii) independence occurring before border regime; (iv) decolonisation resulting in non-sovereign status. When reading these hypothetical scenarios, note that the vertical scale is non-numerical and is meant to provide only a rough order of magnitude. Rather than measuring exact changes in migration volumes, the scenarios help us to understand shifts in migration patterns and identify possible migration diversification along inter-temporal (eg the anticipation of migration), categorical (eg shift from work to family channels) and spatial (eg diversion to alternative destinations) distributions as a result of migrants’ responses to structural and policy changes as well as their opportunities and aspirations.

4.1 Synchronous independence and border regime establishment

When border regimes and independence occur simultaneously, residents may react to high levels of future political and economic uncertainty and migrate pre-emptively. The anticipation of the
establishment of a border regime may cause a spike in emigration, primarily to the former colonial state, right before and around the year of independence (see Figure 2). Ceri Peach (1968) observed that West Indians, who had been migrating to Britain since the late 1940s, rushed to Britain a year before the introduction of the 1962 UK Immigration Act. Migration scholars have called this pattern ‘beat the ban’ migration (Peach 1968) or, more recently, ‘now or never’ migration and inter-temporal substitution effect (cf de Haas 2011). The striped area in Figure 2 represents emigration flows towards the former colonial state under free movement; the figure also shows that before independence, former colonies may have already experienced migration to alternative destinations, notwithstanding the ease of migration to the former colonial state.

**Figure 2. The hypothesised effects of synchronous independence and the establishment of a border regime on international migration**

The composition of existing migration flows may also be altered. Uncertainties may vary along class, ethnic or political lines, leading to various propensities towards migration in the population rather than a collective preference for emigration. Allegedly, the population leaving pre-emptively may reflect more heavily the segments of the population that are most uncertain about the future (eg the political opposition) or who already had migration aspirations and want to ensure entry into the former colonial state (eg job opportunities or family reunification). Migrants may, however, represent the wide spectrum of the population when tensions surrounding independence are heightened, as many families may send at least one individual to the former colonial state as a risk-spreading strategy.

After independence, migration may taper off, particularly if socio-economic conditions are stable and feelings of uncertainty subside, although migration is likely to continue in the immediate post-independence period as the feelings of uncertainty may diminish only gradually. However, migration policies implemented by the former colonial state and other potential destinations may further

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8 Peach’s (1968) main argument was that, since the late 1940s, West Indian immigration had been stimulated by employment opportunities in Britain. However, he also observed an increase in West Indian immigration in anticipation of Britain’s 1962 Immigration Act.
change the structure of migration and produce three additional unintended migration substitution effects: categorical, spatial and reverse migration (de Haas 2011).

Having acquired a new citizenship, former colonial subjects are restricted from entering into the former colonial state, leading aspiring migrants to explore family reunification, study, asylum and any other migration channels, causing categorical substitution. Immigration to Britain over the 1965–1970 period showed that 72 to 86 percent of Commonwealth citizens were entering as dependents using family reunification channels, although it was known that spouses generally went to Britain to work. Categorical substitution, however, is not uniquely about the same individuals switching entry channels. Migration policy changes may inspire individuals who never intended to migrate to do so (eg elderly parents who become eligible for family reunification), while preventing the migration of certain migration-aspiring individuals (eg migrant workers), leading to a change in the composition of migration.

Independence and border regimes may also lead to spatial substitution effects (de Haas 2011) when migration barriers to the former colonial state are too high, the attraction of post-colonial ties is not strong and when migrants have knowledge and feasible access to alternative destinations. Reorientation may be to neighbouring countries and other colonies that belong to the same colonial state or to alternative destinations further afield. Migration from the former British West Indies quickly shifted from Britain after the enactment of Britain’s 1962 Commonwealth Act to North America, where migration policies were becoming more open to non-European migrants (Marshall 1987). Spatial substitution may occur more rapidly when alternative destinations were already a destination of choice before independence and the closure of the border.

Although not represented in Figure 2, a fourth migration substitution effect may occur: namely the reduction of return flows as a result of the stringent rules for (re-)entry in destination countries. From an origin country perspective, this effect would potentially reduce the volume of return and alter the composition of return flows. Empirical evidence shows that return is negatively affected when entry restrictions are high, as migrants prefer to stay put even when they may wish to return, because of the risk of being denied re-entry (Flahaux 2014; Massey 2005). In this and the following three scenarios, this may affect negatively the return of individuals who may see independence and the post-independence period as a time of opportunity.

This first scenario shows that emigration from colonies on their way to independence may experience an independence peak followed by sustained migration. Post-colonial ties may gradually lose their importance, while migration to new destinations may gain relative strength. Should post-independence conditions stabilise, emigration volumes would gradually decrease; in case of persistent high levels of uncertainty or emerging conflict, growing migration would be expected. Regardless of the long-term post-independence conditions, however, these structural changes are expected to lead to a diversification of migration flows in terms of who migrates (eg class, rural/urban, ethnic group) and the migration channels pursued.

4.2 Asynchronous independence and border regime establishment

Independence and the establishment of a border regime are not necessarily simultaneous events. In the British Caribbean, only Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago obtained independence in 1962, within four

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9 However, former colonial states may purposely retain specific migration channels with former colonies as a way to satisfy potential labour demands, thus reducing the size of categorical substitution.
10 Immigration Bill: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Cabinet, CP(70)126, 31 December 1970, The National Archives, Catalogue Reference: CAB/129/154
months of the implementation of Britain’s Immigration Act. The British citizens residing in the other nine former British Caribbean colonies, which gained independence after 1962 (between 1966 and 1983), were unable to migrate freely to Britain in the years leading to independence. On the contrary, in the case of Suriname, the opposite timing took place: border control measures were introduced in stages with a final border closure in 1980, five years after political independence from the Netherlands. The asynchronous timing of these events is expected to affect migration patterns differently, as described next.

4.2.1 Border regime establishment before independence

When border regimes occur before independence, pre-emptive ‘now or never’ migration may occur before border closure (Figure 3); however, political continuity may reduce the perceived risks and large parts of the population may wait and see, particularly if independence is not expected in the immediate future. Thus, the first peak is smaller than in Figure 2. The nearing of independence may prompt another peak of migration as some groups of individuals may see emigration as a risk-reduction strategy (Figure 3), although the inter-temporal substitution effects caused by independence may not be as high as in Figure 2 because of greater migration policy constraints already in place. This second emigration peak may, however, be higher when the country is experiencing high levels of instability and: (i) the former colonial state maintains some non-restrictive immigration channels; (ii) individuals feel strong post-colonial connections (ie leading to categorical substitution); or (iii) alternative destinations offer favourable migration policies (ie spatial substitution). On the other hand, stability and positive future prospects in the new independent country, but also the lack of migration opportunities (both in former colonial state or alternative destinations) and weak post-colonial ties, may produce a less pronounced emigration peak at independence.

Figure 3. The hypothesised effects of the establishment of a border regime followed by independence on international migration

![Figure 3](image_url)

In the interim period between border closure and independence, migration patterns may diversify as migrants adapt to changes in migration channels (eg family channels rather than labour)
and to the gradual reliance on alternative destinations. In contrast to Figure 2, alternative destinations may be well rooted by independence, reducing the relevance of the former colonial state. Under these conditions, the effect of post-colonial ties may weaken rapidly. Nevertheless, a strong post-colonial identity may orient migrants towards countries within the same post-colonial sphere (e.g. former British citizens selecting Canada, which is in the Commonwealth, rather than the United States).

This timing of events may also alter the composition of migration flows. The first peak may be overrepresented by the elite and the middle classes who enjoy access to resources and connections with the colonial government. The lower classes may be unable to migrate before the closure of the border due to limited resources. The second peak would trigger the migration of a different set of individuals fearful of the changes induced by independence. Such fears may encourage even individuals with limited resources to pursue migration, possibly to neighbouring countries or by relying on irregular channels. Nevertheless, the closure of the border would limit emigration, lowering the overall volume of the second peak.

**4.2.2 Border regime establishment after independence**

In the third scenario, independence occurs before the establishment of a border regime, leading to different migration effects. With the nearing of independence, parts of the population may hold expectations of greater opportunities, while other parts of the population may seize the opportunity to emigrate before the official transfer of power (first peak in Figure 4). The first emigration peak may, however, be higher than in the previous scenario given the uncertainties surrounding the impending political and economic changes and the possibility to migrate. Reflecting more closely the first scenario (synchronous independence and border regime), we may see a broader representation of the population among migrants, as more households try to establish a foothold in the former colonial state before the transfer of power and change of citizenship. Migration would be driven by political changes rather than fears of mobility constraints. However, the nature, terms and conditions of the free mobility agreement (e.g. when it is announced, its clarity and fixity of terms) may influence migration decisions.

**Figure 4. The hypothesised effects of independence followed by the establishment of border regime on international migration**
Throughout the interim period, some individuals may rely on the fixed-period open borders to take a ‘wait and see' attitude, resulting in lowered but sustained emigration. Political and economic developments in the newly independent country may greatly influence the confidence of the population in the country’s future and their migration decisions. However, regardless of how stable the newly independent country, the imminent closure of the border would lead to a last minute rush of ‘now or never’ emigration, particularly for those segments of the population unsatisfied by the performance of the newly independent government. The interim period provides citizens some time to witness positive signs of stability and growth, which may lower the urgency to emigrate. If, in addition, the attractiveness of the former colonial state is not high, emigration may actually decrease and settle at much lower levels. While it would be unrealistic to claim that the subsequent establishment of a border regime would not generate a ‘now or never’ effect, its volume may in fact be much weaker in a newly independent country with a bright outlook.

The second emigration peak may be lower than the first peak as the interim period provides ample opportunities to all those who would want and could emigrate to do so before the enactment of entry policies, leading to a degree of ‘saturation’ among most segments of the population. However, ‘saturation’ is short-term, as each year a new cohort of young adults enters the pool of potential migrants and new constraints would quickly generate new aspiring migrants. One certainty is that this sequence of events (independence followed by border regime) would lead to magnified post-colonial effects due to the long period of free mobility and the concomitant concentration of large migrant communities in the former colonial state.

After the implementation of a border regime, those seeking to emigrate would have to find the most permissive channel of entry in the former colonial state or look for alternative destinations. These choices may lead to categorical substitution effects and spatial substitution effects, respectively (de Haas 2011). In this scenario, spatial substitution may be less important than categorical substitution given the strong migrant networks established and concentrated in the former colonial state over the interim years. Thus, categorical substitution is expected to dominate after the establishment of a border regime.

The two asynchronous scenarios similarly forecast two migration peaks, but they differ in terms of volume, with stronger emigration in this last scenario both at independence and in the interim period. The interim period between the two events is strikingly different in the two models. In the previous scenario (subsection 4.2.1), although interim migration is officially still internal migration (migrants are still citizens), individuals face the restrictions of international migration. When independence comes, in spite of the anxiety that the population may feel, a large number of people would not be able to migrate. In this scenario, although migration in the interim period is officially international migration as individuals have already acquired a different nationality, the absence of restrictions equalises it to internal migration. During the interim period, the population would be able to make an informed decision on whether the developments in the newly independent country are satisfactory. Qualitatively, individuals emigrating may be doing so less for the anxiety created by uncertainties and more for the dissatisfaction with developments in the newly independent country. Ultimately, the three models presented so far show that independence and the establishment of a border regime and their timing provide vital insights of the dynamism of migration responses to these structural changes. Section 4.4 and Table 2 provide additional comparative insights.

4.3 Non-sovereignty and weak border regimes

Not all decolonisation results in independence. What migration effects should we expect, if any, when decolonisation results in non-sovereign status? The transition to non-sovereignty involves the
acquisition of greater autonomy, but this shift is relatively risk-free as political and economic developments remain under the tutelage of the former colonial state. The political and economic stability guaranteed by a dependent status led some studies to suggest that non-sovereignty may have minimal effects on emigration, most often discouraging it (Figure 5). A small inter-temporal substitution effect may not be excluded as the transition in political status may encourage emigration of individuals who disagree with the transformation into a dependency. This, however, may only concern a small number of individuals and overall migration may be shaped by factors unrelated to changes of political status.

Figure 5. The hypothesised effects of status change from colony to non-sovereignty on (international) migration

At the same time, non-sovereign countries have an atypical status in terms of citizenship or rights of movement. When former colonies become fully incorporated into the former colonial state (eg French Overseas Departments and Hawaii), citizens enjoy full citizenship and migration is totally unregulated, making it essentially internal migration.\(^1\) The Dutch dependencies hold a middle-path status between independence and complete integration as they are officially an ‘equal’ part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,\(^2\) and their populations retain full Dutch citizenship, which grants freedom of movement to the Netherlands (Oostindie 2006). The British overseas territories, on the other hand, have a specific citizenship, ie British overseas citizenship, which does not grant them automatic right to live and work in Britain.\(^3\) Unlike many other former colonies that acquired independence, however, British non-sovereign countries fully enjoy visa-free travel.\(^4\)

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\(^{11}\) The lack of a border regime does not mean that the state is not involved in regulating migration. In fact, the state may engage in labour recruitment programmes (eg France’s BUMIDOM) that significantly alter the emigration patterns in Figure 5.

\(^{12}\) Since the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles in 2010, Bonaire, Saba, and St Eustatius are incorporated municipalities of the Netherlands.


\(^{14}\) Data from DEMIG VISA database; the exception was Montserrat, which required a visa for UK travel in the 1973-1977 period.
Leaving the British dependencies aside for a moment, non-sovereign countries provide a counterfactual for the effects of independence and the introduction of a border regime. The ease of movement enjoyed by individuals in most non-sovereign countries suggests that migration may be spontaneous and not present spikes such as those seen for independence or border regime establishment. The timing of emigration here may react to specific periods of transformation, such as the introduction of socio-economic reforms, the establishment of a university, the start of large development projects or more simply an economic downturn. Circulation and return migration that may occur easily and with frequency, while category substitution effects may not be relevant as people are able to migrate freely to the former colonial state. The migrant population may be more diverse, representing various segments of the population including greater numbers of lower educated and rural migrants (Grosfoguel 1996). Conversely, British non-sovereign countries may show migration policy substitution effects as British overseas citizens may resort to category jumping or to migrate to alternative destinations in order to overcome British migration policies.

Spatial substitution may occur even if inhabitants enjoy full citizenship and freedom of movement, due to shifts in geopolitical and diplomatic relations and personal preferences. Generally, however, flows to alternative destinations may be weak, a trend that may be explained by more than the absence of a border regime alone. In fact, full citizenship is likely to strengthen feelings of belonging. Identity, post-colonial ties and feelings of entitlement to ‘metropolitan’ opportunities and quality of life, which however may be available only in the former colonial state, may discourage any spatial substitution from non-sovereign countries and a concentration of migration to the former colonial state. Populations in non-sovereign countries may, however, also relate to populations in neighbouring countries where levels of political and economic stability may be lower. Thus, non-sovereign countries may experience low emigration and become destinations, particularly receiving immigrants from neighbouring independent countries.

4.4 Comparative migration effects

The hypothetical scenarios introduced in the previous subsections are summarised in Table 2 so as to facilitate comparison. For each scenario, the table reports how the events and their timing may affect the volume and distribution of flows over time (ie inter-temporal substitution) and generate potential spatial and categorical substitutions. The table also provides specific information on how the composition of migration may change in each scenario by elaborating on shifts in the migrant population across class, age and ethnicity. These insights emerge from the hypothetical scenarios in combination with empirical evidence from elaborations on the cases of Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. This analysis does not include a gender component because these historical events do not seem to produce atypical gender effects. As the table is self-explanatory, I address only three important points concerning shifts in migrant composition.

First, both the non-sovereign country scenario and the scenario of independence followed by a border regime (Figure 4) stimulate all classes of people to migrate. Conversely, in the synchronous timing of events or when borders anticipate independence, migration is primarily of the higher and middle classes. Second, in non-sovereign countries and when borders close before independence, migrants may be overly represented by young working age migrants. This is based on the notion that these individuals may aspire to migrate to pursue work/career opportunities abroad, hence belong to younger working age cohorts (ie 20–45 year-olds). In the other two scenarios, the various political and

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15 Nevertheless, we may observe shifts in preference to alternative destinations, in which case migrants may be faced with the need to engage in categorical substitution.
economic motives would lead all age cohorts to engage in migration. Third, populations with high levels of ethnic diversity may witness specific shifts in the composition of migration along ethnic lines in reaction to independence. The transfer of power and potential fears of discrimination or even oppression may encourage certain ethnic groups to migrate pre-emptively. Conversely, the establishment of a border regime should not have any ethnic-specific effects, unless migration policies target specific ethnic groups or when migration policies target income, education levels and other traits that may exclude disadvantaged ethnic groups.

Table 2. Comparative table of the effects of four scenarios on the volume, destination, migration category and composition of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration effects</th>
<th>Synchronous (Figure 2)</th>
<th>Border regime then independence (Figure 3)</th>
<th>Independence then border regime (Figure 4)</th>
<th>Dependency and weak border regime (Figure 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volume</strong></td>
<td>High and concentrated in one peak</td>
<td>Medium first migration peak</td>
<td>High first peak</td>
<td>Low emigration peak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid decline after independence/ border establishment</td>
<td>Rapid decline in interim period</td>
<td>Sustained interim emigration</td>
<td>Continued low/ gradual emigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destination</strong></td>
<td>Towards former colonial state (FCS) before independence and border regime</td>
<td>Towards FCS before border regime</td>
<td>Towards FCS before and after independence</td>
<td>Towards FCS before and after change of political status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afterwards some diversification to alternative destinations</td>
<td>Diversification in interim period</td>
<td>Strong emigration towards FCS in interim period</td>
<td>Migration to other non-sovereign territories of FCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At independence diversification established, reduced relevance of FCS</td>
<td>Continued migration to FCS after establishment of border regime</td>
<td>Low migration to alternative destinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration policy category</strong></td>
<td>After independence and border regime, work permits required and heavier reliance on family reunification, study, asylum and possibly resorting to undocumented entry and stay</td>
<td>After border regime work permits required and heavier reliance on family reunification, study, asylum and possibly resorting to undocumented entry and stay</td>
<td>After independence no major change in category</td>
<td>No categorical substitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At independence, categorical substitution to alternative destinations</td>
<td>After border regime work permits required and heavier reliance on family reunification, study, asylum and possibly resorting to undocumented entry and stay; small categorical substitution in alternative destinations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td>Elite and middle classes</td>
<td>At border closure</td>
<td>At independence</td>
<td>Small elite and middle classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower classes with migration connections</td>
<td>Elite and middle classes</td>
<td>All classes, including lower classes</td>
<td>Small lower classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most lower class unable to migrate</td>
<td>Lower classes with migration connections</td>
<td>At border closure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most lower class unable to migrate</td>
<td>All classes, including lower classes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Conclusions

The first objective of this paper was to explore the role of states in shaping migration patterns and develop a broader perspective of the migration-relevance of state policies in both origin and destination countries. I have introduced a simple categorisation, which considers two broad policy groups, migration and non-migration policies, and considers their migration and non-migration policy objectives and policy tools. Two main observations can be drawn. Although migration policies are often defined as policies with migration objectives, research on migration policies considers policies that do not have a migration objective but use a migration tool (e.g., residence permit for investors). Concurrently, policies that use migration tools (e.g., increasing university courses to decrease migration for education) are largely ignored although they might have migration objectives. While these policies may appear as marginal in comparison to the broad range of migration policies that have been created over time (cf. de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2014), they remain largely unexplored and may provide some explanation of why certain policies may not have an effect on migration (i.e., if their objective in fact is about investment).

A second observation is that migration research remains focused on migration policies largely ignoring other non-migration policies that do not utilise migration tools. Because these policies appear unrelated and irrelevant for migration they are overlooked, although they may produce migration effects. Among such policies are privatisation of social care services or changes in university tuition fees, which may possibly affect individuals and have migration-stimulating effects both in origin and destination countries. By reassessing the role of the state in migration through both its migration and non-migration policies, not only we start to perceive of the role of the state in migration as more pervasive, but we suddenly see a realm of ways in which states in origin countries may also play an active role in migration. A broader perspective of the role of the state in migration invites us to explore
whether some migration outcomes, which may not be explained by migration policies or other observable migration drivers, may perhaps be explained by non-migration policies.

The second objective of this paper was to understand the migration effects of the transition of former colonies into independent or non-sovereign countries. This has been achieved through a conceptual elaboration which accounts for the heterogeneity of the colonial and decolonisation experiences, the distinction between independence and the establishment of border regimes and their timing, the passage of time and contextual transformations, and the agency of individuals in the post-colonial environment. Four hypothetical scenarios elaborate on the expected migration effects when: (i) independence and the border regime occur at the same time; (ii) border regime occurs before independence; (iii) independence occurs before the border regime; (iv) decolonisation results in non-sovereign status.

Four main insights have emerged, showing that independence and border regimes may fundamentally shift the motivations and composition (i.e., class, age and ethnic group), the volume and concentration, migration policy channels and the direction of migration. First, independence and border regimes generate different motivations for migration. On one hand, independence may create ambiguous feelings including a sense of anxiety and an urgent need among segments of the population to emigrate to reach stability, leading to emigration. Even without the establishment of a border regime, independence may affect emigration. On the other hand, the establishment of a border regime may affect mainly people who already aspired to migrate, ultimately a different and smaller proportion of the population. In non-sovereign countries, the absence of these structural changes suggests that emigration would continue gradually in association with other socio-economic drivers of emigration.

Second, the timing of independence and border regimes may determine the volume and distribution of migration over the short- to medium-term. The reaction to these events is rapid, with immediate responses both to the introduction of border regimes and independence, and a rapid emigration decline thereafter. The dynamics are different across the four scenarios. When independence and border regimes occur synchronously and the anxieties of independence join those of migration restriction, the different segments of the population affected by these anxieties will react simultaneously, leading to high emigration flows before independence and border closure, resulting in the concentration of this transition into one migration peak.

Asynchronous border regime and independence lead to the distribution of migration in two peaks. When a border regime occurs before independence, emigration rapidly becomes constrained as stricter immigration policies have been introduced. As independence nears, emigration increases again, but not as much as if migration policies to the former colonial state were not in place. Conversely, independence followed by a border regime may lead to an important expansion of emigration volume due to anxiety for independence. By the time the border regime is established, most individuals who wanted to emigrate would have been able to do so, arguably even among the low-income classes. Yet, a second peak of emigration may occur as a last rush to ‘beat the ban’. This scenario may result in long-term migration effects due to the cumulative effects of a large migrant population resident in the former colonial state. The lack of structural shocks and relative political and socio-economic stability in non-sovereign countries suggests that migration may not show any large peaks.

Third, the timing of independence and border regimes may provide valuable insights on category jumping. Conceptually, categorical substitution, namely the practice of switching migration channels to emigrate in this case mainly to the former colonial state is weakest in non-sovereign countries, which would experience no categorical substitutions due to low or absent migration policy barriers. When border closure occurs before independence, the desire to emigrate leading up to independence may be stronger than what is allowed by the migration policies in the former colonial
state, leading to some categorical jumping but also to a diversification to alternative destinations. In the synchronous scenario a similar phenomenon may also occur, although cumulative migration to former colonial state may strengthen categorical jumping. Lastly, when independence occurs before border closure, the desire to emigrate to the former colonial state, where strong migrant communities exist, may lead to a strong diversification of migration categories to overcome stricter immigration policies.

Finally, the timing of events may provide valuable insights on the shifts in migration destinations, shedding light on the relevance of post-colonial ties. In non-sovereign countries, post-colonial ties should largely determine emigration destination choice to the former colonial state, as long as migration to the former colonial state is weakly or not regulated, leading to low or no spatial substitution. When independence occurs before border closure, migration to the former colonial state is reinforced, thus strengthening post-colonial ties, and weakening migration to alternative destinations. In the synchronous scenario, migration to the former colonial state would be gradually weakened by the rapid imposition of restrictive migration policies. Establishing a border regime before independence introduces destination diversification and strong spatial substitution early on, suggesting a rapid weakening of post-colonial ties.

While the scenarios help us to identify the short- to medium-term effects of post-colonial ties, it is extremely difficult to determine whether there is an actual end of colonial influences on migration decisions or if post-colonial ties may instead become ‘dormant’, and be used in an instrumental way when needs arise. Case study research is needed to understand how post-colonial ties, as well as independence and border regimes, affect migration decision-making in practice.

It should be noted that due to their hypothetical nature, the scenarios in this paper highlighted primarily the (bilateral) political and migration policy changes, although we cannot ignore that a variety of other factors may also exert influence on migration decisions, such as the role of independence movements and peaceful or violent decolonisation processes, domestic politics, the establishment of a political system and the development of educational and economic priorities. All of these factors, among others, and their potential migration effects need to be conceptualised beyond what was possible in this paper, particularly when we move beyond exploring the short- to mid-term migration effects of independence and border regimes to understand the evolution of long-term migration patterns.

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16 It could be argued that post-colonial ties may become ‘dormant’ and be reactivated at the most opportune moment (eg Latin American migration to Spain in the last decade).
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